POL 3 Lecture Notes - Lecture 8: Cuban Missile Crisis, Deductive Reasoning, Preventive War
27 Nov 2017
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Bargaining and war: the war puzzle of power/security dilemmas, bargaining approach attempts to explain war without bringing in theories/balance. Multiple outcomes possible, including war: compellence - use threats to , deterrence - use threats to , ex. senkaku islands; cuban missile crisis. The status quo i. ii. iii. f. 3: the efficiency pu le of )ar (cid:840)i. e. the rationalist pu le(cid:841, )ar is . Ask why they went to war instead of saving costs and ending up with a better outcome: war as bargaining i. Expected outcome division a. b. i. ii. iii. Bargaining range: anything that falls in the range (cid:840)orange(cid:841) is preferable to fighting a, the divisions of finite goods that are acceptable to both sides war. Given rationalist assumptions, war is thus ex post inefficient iv. v: )hy is war chosen over the more efficient, non-war outcomes, three possible reasons for war, )ar and incomplete information. Actors lack information about one another"s resolve or capabilities.
