PHIL 111 Chapter Notes - Chapter 5: Lewis White Beck, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Practical Reason
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 7 April 25, 1967
137
Now in conclusion to these introductory remarks, let me return to the difficulty which I
stated shortly before: How can the form of the law produce the matter? Now I have
referred earlier in this course to Rousseau’s doctrine of the general will. When he speaks
or uses the phrase “generalizing the will,” we have a will prior to any action of ours as
members of a legislative assembly. And then when we act in the assembly, we are
compelled to generalize the will, because what we are to determine now is not what I
will, but a law. And therefore I have to look at my will, for example, the will not to pay
any taxes, in the form “there shall be a law that no one shall pay taxes.” And then I see
that my previous will is foolish.
Kant radicalizes this much beyond the realm of politics. Kant speaks not of the previous
will only [LS taps on the table] willing this or that or not willing this or that, but of the
maxim on which I would like or inclined to act. And then I have
19
not to generalize
merely but to universalize my maxim—and if my maxim stands the test of
universalization then it is permitted or moral. And failing that it is immoral.
Now the matter, in other words, which we need is supplied by the maxims. We always
have maxims, but the morality is not supplied by the maxims. The morality is supplied
only by the quality of the maxims to be universalizable. Is this,
20
up to this point, clear?
So
21
it seems that the question of the matter doesn’t arise. The precise solution of this
problem occurs not in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals but in the somewhat
later work, The Critique of Practical Reason. Now will you read, Mr. Reinken, on page
72, here. Now one moment: this is part of the section called “Of the Typic of Pure
Practical Judgment.” We cannot go within the short time at our disposal into this very
technical language of Kant. We simply leave it at that, as if there were no particular
difficulty involved. To some extent what we have to read now is intelligible by itself.
Now.
Mr. Reinken: “The rule of judgment—”
vii
LS: “The rule.” I would underline that, or emphasize that.
Mr. Reinken:
The rule of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is: Ask yourself whether,
if the action which you propose should take place by a law of nature of which you
yourself were a part—
viii
LS: Just as in Rousseau’s scheme, you are a part of the assembly which decides about
paying or not paying taxes. So it wouldn’t make sense if you were stating the problem of
an assembly in [a] South Sea Island; then you can still go on to say, “No. No taxes there.”
It’s none of your business. But here of a [law of] nature of which you are a part. Yes.
vii
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1956), 72.
viii
Ibid.
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 7 April 25, 1967
138
Mr. Reinken: “of which
22
you yourself were a part, you could regard it as possible
through your will—”
ix
LS: “Through your will.” That is important. Both you are a member of that “assembly” or
that whole; and you are responsible. Would you
23
regard it as possible through your will.
Yes?
Mr. Reinken:
Everyone does, in fact, decide by this rule whether actions are morally
good or bad. Thus people ask: If one belonged to such an order of things
that anyone would allow himself to deceive when he thought it to his
advantage, or felt justified in shortening his life as soon as he was
thoroughly weary of it, or looked with complete indifference on the need
of others, would he assent of his own will to being a member of such an
order of things? Now everyone knows very well that if he secretly permits
himself to deceive, it does not follow that everyone else will do so, or that
if, unnoticed by others, he is lacking in compassion, it does not mean that
everyone else will immediately take the same attitude toward him. This
comparison of the maxims of his actions with a universal natural law,
therefore, is not the determining ground of his will.
x
LS: That is crucial. That is not the determining ground of his will because, on the basis of
mere calculation, it might well pay to lie or to be uncharitable and so on and so on. Yes?
Mr. Reinken: “But such a law is still—”
xi
LS: And here he speaks [of] a general, natural law. Yes?
Mr. Reinken:
But such a law is still a type for the estimation of maxims according to moral
principles. If the maxim of action is not so constituted as to stand the test of being
made the form of a natural law in general, it is morally impossible [though it may
still be possible in nature]. Even—
xii
LS: Now let us stop here. Now in other words,
24
as we will see later on in the
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, there is one strict formula and that is the one
which we have read last time; but then there are also types, as Kant calls it, or, as one can
say, symbolic presentations of the moral law which are very helpful for us to make clear
the meaning of the moral law, although we must not take these types as literally true.
Now let us skip the end of this paragraph as well as the next, and then go on.
ix
Ibid.
x
Ibid.
xi
Ibid.
xii
Ibid. Brackets in original.
Document Summary
Now i have referred earlier in this course to rousseau"s doctrine of the general will. When he speaks or uses the phrase generalizing the will, we have a will prior to any action of ours as members of a legislative assembly. And then when we act in the assembly, we are compelled to generalize the will, because what we are to determine now is not what i will, but a law. Kant radicalizes this much beyond the realm of politics. Kant speaks not of the previous will only [ls taps on the table] willing this or that or not willing this or that, but of the maxim on which i would like or inclined to act. And then i have19 not to generalize merely but to universalize my maxim and if my maxim stands the test of universalization then it is permitted or moral. Now the matter, in other words, which we need is supplied by the maxims.
