PHIL 111 Chapter Notes - Chapter 5: Embezzlement, Mathematical Proof, Internal Fixation
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 6 April 20, 1967
117
regarded as the effect of the law on the subject and not as the cause of the
law. Respect is properly—vii
LS: So in other words, it is not that we have the feeling of respect which then, as it were,
projects something which would be the object of respect. But the respect follows the law
and is a response to the law. Yes?
Mr. Reinken:
is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-love. Thus it is
regarded as an object neither of inclination nor of fear, though it has something
analogous to both. The only object of respect is the law, and indeed only the law
which we impose on ourselves and yet recognize as necessary in itself. As a law,
we are subject to it without consulting self-love; as imposed on us by ourselves, it
is a consequence of our will. In the former respect it is analogous to fear and in
the latter to inclination.viii
LS: Now let us stop here. We impose the law on ourselves, a point which will be taken
up by Kant more fully later.25 In this strict sense, man is autonomous if he imposes the
law, the moral law on himself. Now here we understand perhaps somewhat better what
Kant means by this equality of all men. Men are equal in the most important respect,
namely in the highest respect. And that clearly contradicts what Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau meant.26 What Kant says reminds of the equality of men before God, but there
is this difference: in the biblical view the law to which man is subject27 does not originate
in man. It is a law of nature, or divine, or whatever it may be but28 man is not
autonomous in the Kantian sense.
Now let us read one more point, yes, in the next paragraph29 [in] which Kant raises a
question which every reader must have felt necessary to raise at this point.30 “What kind
of.”
Mr. Reinken:
kind of a law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will
without reference to the expected result? Under this condition alone the
will can be called absolutely good without qualification. Since I have
robbed the will of all impulses which could come to it from obedience to
any law, nothing remains to serve as a principle of the will except
universal conformity of its action to law as such. That is, I should never
act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a
universal law. Mere conformity to law as such—ix
LS: To lawfulness, to the form of law.
Mr. Reinken: Conformity to law, to the full?
vii Ibid., 17-18.
viii Ibid., 18.
ix Ibid.
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The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 6 April 20, 1967
118
LS: No,31 the conformity to lawfulness—
Mr. Reinken: Oh, lawfulness.
LS: I’m sorry.
Mr. Reinken: Sorry. “Mere conformity to lawfulness (without assuming any particular
law applicable to certain actions) serves—”x
LS: No. Without assuming any law limited or directed towards specific actions. For
example, it is not, say, a law like “Thou shalt not lie,” or something, yeah?32 Lawfulness
in general. Yes?
Mr. Reinken:
(not assuming any law limited to certain actions) serves as the principle of the
will, and it must serve as such a principle if duty is not to be a vain delusion and
chimerical concept.xi
LS: Let us stop here for a moment. Now Kant has made clear that we act morally if we
do not act33 from ulterior motives. That is intelligible, easily intelligible. He says,
furthermore, there must not be any ends: merely the action itself is the end, as we may
say for the time being.34 And therefore the question is: What kind of law is that? And
Kant gives here this provisional answer:35 we have a maxim. We always have maxims,
whether we know them or not, but it is our duty to make them clear to ourselves. And
then we have to wish, to will that my maxim on which I habitually act should be capable
of becoming a universal law. The maxim should be able to comply with the demand for
universal lawfulness, if one can express it this way. And if it is capable of that, then the
maxim is morally good, otherwise it is morally bad. There is no law like “Thou shalt not
lie,” for example. The law is merely formal. You should also be able to will that your
maxim should become a universal law. That’s the first formulation. Kant will later on call
it the categoric imperative.
And the great question is: Where do we get any determination of our action? In the
traditional view, one would have said that one must do the right thing in the right spirit.
But the right spirit itself will not yet tell you what the right thing is. And Kant as it were
says: No, the right spirit properly understood will also tell you what the right thing is, and
that is the great difficulty which we have tried to understand. Kant gives a provisional
example. Let us read that. But first read the end of the paragraph which we began.
Mr. Reinken:
The common reason of mankind in its practical judgments is in perfect
agreement with this and has this principle constantly in view.
x Ibid.
xi Ibid.
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Document Summary
117 regarded as the effect of the law on the subject and not as the cause of the law. Ls: so in other words, it is not that we have the feeling of respect which then, as it were, projects something which would be the object of respect. But the respect follows the law and is a response to the law. Mr. reinken: is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-love. Thus it is regarded as an object neither of inclination nor of fear, though it has something analogous to both. The only object of respect is the law, and indeed only the law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognize as necessary in itself. As a law, we are subject to it without consulting self-love; as imposed on us by ourselves, it is a consequence of our will. In the former respect it is analogous to fear and in the latter to inclination. viii.
