PSYC 213 Chapter Notes - Chapter 1.6: Intentionality, Behaviorism, Operationalization
3 Mar 2017
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Objection 4: the luminous room suppose they say that someone waves a magnet, as quickly as you can, (problem is that you are not physically capable of moving it quickly enough to produce light) We cannot make sense of the animal"s behavior without the ascription of intentionality. They are defined in terms of their content, not their form: mental states and events are literally a produced of the operation of the brain, but the program is not in that way a product of the computer. He is a materialist: he is not arguing that machines cannot think. He asserts explicitly those human beings are simply thinking (biological) machines. Brains are machines and brains think: he is not arguing that thinking organisms necessarily have to be made out of biological material it may be possible to produce a thinking machine out of non-biological material.
