PHL 150 Lecture Notes - Lecture 5: Property Dualism, John Locke, Physicalism
6 Dec 2016
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Lockean view > compatible with non reductive physicalism and dualism: non reductive physicalism: physical facts logically implies mental facts, substance dualism: mind and body are 2 distinct, separate things, property dualism: mind has non-physical properties. Baker"s view > compatible with nonproductive physicalism: you are a human person. Essentially a person- can"t be anything else. Not essentially human- you can have a robot body > not human but still existing: you are constituted by a physical body > living animal. (clay (your body) does not equal a statue (you) > clay constitutes the statue, but is not identical to statue) Human part can change in theory (robot body) In virtue of person a at time t and person b at time t are the same.
