POLSCI 160 Lecture 12: Lecture Twelve Notes
Document Summary
2003 us and gb invade iraq to overthrow him. Battles reveal relative military strength and resolve. Recovery of military power of the loser. War aims affect the commitment problem in ending a war. Size of winning coalition and selectorate of a state affects its war aims. Public goods: security of members of society, ideological goals. Material value of territory increases state resources and so the amount of private benefits the leader can provide. If territory has strategic value, it could increase public good of personal security. Policy ends generally produce public goods, but you need active participation of defeated state. Political incentives to renege on a peace deal. This commitment problem raises problem of winning the peace. Political incentives for a puppet to do as the victor wishes. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territory than those who answer to a large winning coalition. Large winning coalition, more likely to overthrow enemy leaders.
