POL 3 Lecture Notes - Lecture 9: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Cuban Missile Crisis
13 Nov 2017
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Security dilemma otherwise do(cid:874); i. c. i. ii. Resolute and capable: destructive capacity of nukes. General deterrence - don"t have to explicitly state every day don"t use nukes: deter use of nukes by others i. ii. i, second-strike capability i. Large # of delivery vehicles that deliver weapons/aircraft. Geographic dispersion of delivery vehicles and warheads (cid:873)hardened(cid:874) launch sites. Concealment of launch sites/nuclear warheads + mobility of launch sites. The nuclear triad (cid:840)slbm(cid:841) i. ii. iii. iv. v. i. Immediate deterrence - explicit threat to use nuclear force, in order to prevent use of nuclear force: threaten opponent into submission d. (cid:873)first mover(cid:874) advantage i. If you can be the first country to credible threaten to use nuclear power, the other country should logically rationally back down (cid:840) straight/straight . Deterrence as a : brinkmanship in the cold war. Credible threat to do an irrational thing: nobody , nuclear a. i. ii. iii.
