PHILOS 1 Lecture Notes - Lecture 20: Type Physicalism, Supervenience, Mental Property
Document Summary
Supervenience physicalism seems to be true (ex. Consciousness does causally correlate with brain processes. Whenever you feel pain, a particular type of brain state is. Suppose that supervenience physicalism is true but consciousness is he thing left tokened outside of the physicalist picture. Pain is toke-identical to a brain state, but the phenomenality of pain cannot be explained by the terms of physics. If so, sensations or the mind, consciousness, phenomenal experiences, etc. If sensations cannot be explained by natural sciences such as neuroscience, then sensations are entities that supervene on the physical but cannot be explained by the terms of natural sciences. That is, the instantiation of a mental property always accompanies the instantiation of a property of the physical substance. There is a nomological regularity between a mental event and a brain event, but the former is not explicable by the latter. A nomological relation, in most cases, involves a reductive relation.
