PHIL 212 Lecture Notes - Lecture 3: Multiple Realizability, Type Physicalism, Anthropocentrism
4 May 2018
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Philosophy of Mind
9.12.17 Lecture Notes – Functionalism
- Identity theory seems anthropocentric
o According to MBIT, mental states are identical to human brain states
o Identity theory insists that pain is identical to some neural state/process in human brains, such
as c-fibers firing
o But hat aout aials? Could’t a aial that has a opletel diffeet phsial akeup
also feel pain?
o Some animals have nervous systems that are radically different from our own
o If we claim that an octopus or even silicon-based aliens can feel pain, then it would be difficult
to reconcile with identity theory
o If you believe that computers or AI can have mental experiences, then surely, those experiences
cannot be identical to a brain state
o I othe ods, the theo does’t allo fo ultiple ealizailit
o Solution to the problem – identity theorists can just say that there are different neural realizers
for pain in different animals
- Note: I Blok’s atile, phsialis efes to idetit theo
- Multiple realizability
o It seems like mental states are multiply realizable
▪ Multiple realizability: the same mental state can be realized by different physical
substrates
▪ Mental types like pain or desire are not identical to any one physical type such as c-fiber
firing = you cannot be an identity theorist
o Response to identity theorists: If there are different neural realizers for different kinds of
aials’ pai, the hat is the ooalit aong all these pains?
Functionalism
- David Armstrong, Hillary Putnam
- Functionalism: what makes something a mental state of a particular kind is the causal role that it plays
o Concept of a state that is apt of be the cause of certain effects or apt to be the effect of certain
causes
o They have certain characteristic causes and characteristic effects
o In short, mental states are characterized in terms of what they do
- Ex: Pain (the list is just an approximation)
o Pain is an inner state that plays a particular causal role
o Characteristic cause: tissue damage for instance
o Characteristic effect: wincing, groaning
o Characteristic effect: A desire to be rid of the pain (a state that causes other states)
- Generalizability?
o Course-grain similarity among people
- An analogy: poison
o A poison is something that produces a certain effect – i.e. something which, when ingested,
causes an organism to get sick or die
o Different poisons can be made of different physical substrates
o Mental states are similar
o What makes something a pain is not what it is made out of, but what the pain does
Functionalism and Behaviorism
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
Identity theory seems anthropocentric: according to mbit, mental states are identical to human brain states. Could(cid:374)"t a(cid:374) a(cid:374)i(cid:373)al that has a (cid:272)o(cid:373)pletel(cid:455) diffe(cid:396)e(cid:374)t ph(cid:455)si(cid:272)al (cid:373)akeup also feel pain: some animals have nervous systems that are radically different from our own. If we claim that an octopus or even silicon-based aliens can feel pain, then it would be difficult to reconcile with identity theory. If you believe that computers or ai can have mental experiences, then surely, those experiences cannot be identical to a brain state. I(cid:374) othe(cid:396) (cid:449)o(cid:396)ds, the theo(cid:396)(cid:455) does(cid:374)"t allo(cid:449) fo(cid:396) (cid:373)ultiple (cid:396)ealiza(cid:271)ilit(cid:455: solution to the problem identity theorists can just say that there are different neural realizers for pain in different animals. Note: i(cid:374) blo(cid:272)k"s a(cid:396)ti(cid:272)le, ph(cid:455)si(cid:272)alis(cid:373) (cid:396)efe(cid:396)s to ide(cid:374)tit(cid:455) theo(cid:396)(cid:455) In short, mental states are characterized in terms of what they do. Functionalism is still a form of physicalism: each individual mental state is still identical to some individual physical states.
