PHL101Y1 Lecture Notes - Lecture 3: Mental Property
Document Summary
Assuming ryle was right to reject substantivalism (to have a mind is not to be in possession of a mental substance whether material or spiritual) A (ryle): to have a mind is nothing more ethan for one"s behavior to be describable using mental vocabulary. Problem: surely my mind is just an internal cause of my behavior not behavior itself. A (property dualist): to have a mind is nothing more than to have a brain, which in addition to its material properties (shape, mass, neurobiological properties) has spiritual properties. Spiritual properties just are one"s mental experiences and mental states (thoughts, beliefs, desires) Solution: mind-brain theory (identity theory, in short) form of materialism. Smart: agrees with property dualist in that having mind means having a brain that instantiates mental properties difference: dualist insists these mental properties are spiritual properties of the brain . Smart says mental properties are numerically identical with the brain"s material properties.
