PHIL 150B1 Chapter Notes - Chapter 3: Immanuel Kant

• School: University of Arizona
• Department: Philosophy Main
• Course: PHIL 150B1
• Professor: Laura Howard

Document Summary

Notes sexual morality (cid:862)a liberal view of sexual morality and the concept of using another person(cid:863) by thomas. The morall(cid:455) ig(cid:374)ifi(cid:272)a(cid:374)t e(cid:374)se of (cid:862)usi(cid:374)g a(cid:374)other perso(cid:374)(cid:863) Using someone as a means is okay, but using them merely as a means is incompatible. It is (cid:373)orall(cid:455) (cid:449)ro(cid:374)g for a to use b (cid:373)erel(cid:455) as a (cid:373)ea(cid:374)s to a(cid:272)hie(cid:448)e a"s e(cid:374)ds with respect to their personhood. When we undermine the voluntary or informed character of their consent to interact with us in some desired way. Hence, using another person can arise in at least two important ways: coercion which undermines voluntary consent, deception which undermines informed consent (cid:862)o(cid:272)(cid:272)urre(cid:374)t(cid:863) (cid:272)oer(cid:272)io(cid:374) i(cid:374)(cid:448)ol(cid:448)es the use of ph(cid:455)si(cid:272)al force. Dispositional coercion involves the threat of harm. The victim of dispositional coercion does intentionally choose a certain course of action; ho(cid:449)e(cid:448)er, o(cid:374)e"s (cid:272)hoi(cid:272)e, i(cid:374) the fa(cid:272)e of the threat of har(cid:373), is less tha(cid:374) full(cid:455) (cid:448)olu(cid:374)tar(cid:455)