Government 1760 Chapter Notes - Chapter Helen Milner: Marxism, Hegemonic Stability Theory
18 Jun 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
International*Theories*of*Cooperation*Among*Nations
"This&academic&effort&has&been&sparked&in&part&by&the&increasingly&visible&
attempts&of&states&since&the&early&1970's&to&organize&cooperation&in&economic&
and&security&affairs"&(466)
•
Prisoner's&dilemma&(PD)&has&proliferated&as&the&KEY&metaphor&of&
international&politics
§
Uses%game%theory%as%central%tool%of%analysis
○
THIS&REVIEW&ARGUES&THAT&THESE&METHODOLIGICAL&CHOICES&HAVE&
CONTRIBUTED&TO&BOTH&THE&GREATEST&STRENGTHS&AND&WEAKNESSES&
OF&THE&LITERATURE&IN&EXPLAINING&COOPERATION&AMONG&NATIONS
○
IR%literature%regarding%cooperation%has%tended%to%focus%on%the%sources%of%and%
constraints%on%cooperative%behavior%among%states%as%a%function%of%the%
international%system
•
Policy&coordination then%implies%that%the%policies%of%each%
state%have%been%adjusted%to%reduce%their%negative%
consequences%for%the%other%states
□
COOPERATION:&"when%actors%adjust%their%behavior%to%the%actual%or%
anticipated%preferences%of%others,%through%a%process%of%policy%
coordination"%(467)
§
Robert&Keohane&helped%create%a%common%definition%of%the%phenomenon%
of%international%cooperation
○
But%does%assume%rational%behavior%for%all
A)
Assumes%each%actor's%behavior%is%directed%toward%some%goal%
(doesn't%need%to%be%the%same%goal%for%all%actors%involved)
1)
The%gains%don't%have%to%be%the%same%in%magnitude%or%kind%for%
each%state,%but%must%be%mutual
A)
Each%actor%helps%the%other%to%realize% their%goal%by%adjusting%its%
policies%in%the%anticipation%of%its%own&reward
B)
The%actors%aren't%out%to%necessarily%help%the%others,%but%it%is%
the%anticipation%of%bettering%one's%own%situation%that%leads%to%
the%adjustment%in%one's%policies
C)
Cooperation%provides%the%actors%with%gains%or%rewards
2)
Cooperation%is%opposed%to%conflict%or%competition,%which%
implies%goal-seeking%behavior%that%strives%to%reduce%the%gains%
available%to%others%or%to%impede%their%want-satisfaction
□
What%is%not%cooperation?
§
Cooperation
○
Unilateral&behavior:%actors%do%not%take%account%of%the%effects%of%
their%actions%on%others
§
Inactivity
§
Alternatives%to%Cooperation
○
"WHAT&COUNTS&AS&COOPERATION&THUS&DEPENDS&ON&THE&TWO&
ELEMENTS&MENTIONED&ABOVE:&GOAL-DIRECTED&BEHAVIOR&THAT&
ENTAILS&MUTUAL&POLICY&ADJUSTMENTS&SO&THAT&ALL&SIDES&END&UP&
BETTER& OFF&THAN&THEY&WOULD&OTHERWISE&BE"&(468)
○
Keohane,%Kenneth%Oye,%Joseph%Grieco,%Peter%Hass%all%employ%the%same%
defintion
○
Tacit:%occur%without%communication%or%explicit% agreement%
(Prisoner's&Dilemma)
1)
Haas%looks%to%explain%cooperation%by%examining%the%
impact%of%ideas%and%learning%promoted%by%a%cohesive%
scientific%community
a)
Negotiated:%most%common%type%of%cooperation2)
If%the%stronger%party%also%adjusts%its%own%policies%and%
attempts%to%realize% mutual%gains,%cooperation%has%
occurred%
a)
Imposed:%the%stronger%party%in%a%relationship%can%force%the%
other%side%to%alter%its%policies
3)
How%can%you%achieve%cooperation?
§
Conditions%under%which%cooperation%is%likely%to%occur
§
Cooperation&
○
Strengths
•
States%cooperate%in%order%to%realize%absolute%gains
○
Cooperating%in%the%PD%situation%is%their%preferred%strategy□
Due%to%cheating%and%the%inability%to%sanction%it,%the%optimal%
way%to%achieve%absolute%gains%is%by%using%a%Tit-for-Tat%
approach%to%induce%mutual%cooperation
□
Axelrod:%states%seem%to%maximize%their%utility
§
Axelrod,%Keohane%argue%that%cooperative%behavior%is%more%likely%
when%states%pursue%a%strategy%of%reciprocity,%because%they%know%
that%they%will%be%punished%for%defecting%and%rewarding%for%
cooperating
§
Game%Theorists:%key%element%associated%with%reciprocity%are%
sanctioning%and%iteration
§
Concern&for&relative&gains&is&thus&likely&to&impede&
cooperation
®
Cooperation%is%much%more%difficult%when%all%sides%can%achieve%
absolute%gains,%because%no%state%wants%to%realize%fewer%
absolute%gains%than%any%other
□
Fear%of%cheating%or%fear%of%strengthening%the%
other?
◊
What%leads%to%this%desire%for%balance?
®
Grieco's%book%is%mostly%about%how%cooperation%should%never%
occur,%however%he%does%identify%one%condition%that%promotes%
it:%the&achievement&of&a&balanced&distribution&of&gains
□
Grieco:%argues%that%states%also%pursue%relative%gains,%always%seeking%
to%compare%their%absolute%gains%with%those%of%other%states
§
Economic%Reasoning:%states%act%rationally%to%increase%the%net%benefits%
they%receive
○
Equal%absolute%gains%imply%no%relative%changes%if%and%only%if%the%
states%are%equivalent%in%all%aspects
§
Proportional%absolute%gains%imply%no%relative%change%-->%the%closest%
to%the%notion%of%reciprocity%as%commonly%used
§
Balanced%vs.%Equal%Gains
○
Grieco:%criticizes% that%he%neglects%how%the%net%benefits%of%
collaboration%are%distributed%among%the%players
§
Axelrod:%exchange%is%balanced,%payoffs%to%the%players%are%symmetric
○
Absolute%Gains,%Relative%Gains,%and%Reciprocity%Hypotheses•
Defection&problem:%large%numbers%increase%the%probability%of%
defection%and%reduce%the%feasibility%of%sanctioning%defectors
§
If%one%is%concerned%about%cheating,%a%larger%number%of%
players%may%be%better%since%it%provides%more%
opportunities%for%exchanges%and%side-payments
1)
Can%be%broken%down%into%situations%involving%
smaller%numbers
i)
The%number%of%actors%may%not%be%a%structural%condition%
but%rather%may%be%a%strategic%one%that%can%be%
manipulated%by%the%actors%themselves
2)
More%dangerous%to%suffer%a%loss%in%a%world%with%
fewer%actors%than%in%one%with%more%players
i)
Recent%work%in%game%theory%shows%that%the%possibility%
of%cooperation%in%a%relative%gains%environment%can%be%
enhanced%by%increasing%the%number%of%players
3)
Challenges%to%this%theory:%□
TWO&IS&THE&IDEAL&NUMBER&OF&PLAYERS
§
Hypothesis:&"the&prospects&for&cooperation&diminish&as&the&number&of&
players&increases"%(473)
○
Numbers%of%Actors%Hypothesis•
A%third%hypothesis%explaining%cooperation%focuses%on%the%players'%
expectations%about%the%future%%-->%their%willingness%to%cooperate%is%
influenced%by%whether%they%believe% they%will%continue%to%interact%
indefinitely
○
Many%have%shown%that%adding%repeated%play%(ITERATION) to%the%PD%game%
makes%the%cooperative%outcome%more%likely%
○
Iteration%Hypothesis•
Mitigate%the%effects%of%international%anarchy%for%states%by%aiding%in%
the%decentralized%enforcement%of%agreements
§
Regimes%facilitate%cooperation%through%the%functions%they%perform%for%
states
○
International%Regimes%Hypothesis•
Haas:%"the%strength%of%cooperative%arrangements%will%be%
determined%by%the%domestic%power%amassed%by%
members%of%the%epistemic%community%within%their%
respective%governments"%(479)
®
But%Haas%does%not%see%it%this%way%-->%instead,%it%should%initiate%
cooperation%by%spreading%its%common%understanding%of%an%
issue%
□
The%existence% of%an%epistemic%community%would%seem%in%this%view%
to%be%a%prerequisite%for%cooperation
§
Such%a%community%is%"a%professional%group%that%believes%in%the%same%
cause-and-effect%relationships,%truth%tests%to%accept%them,%and%shares%
common%values;%its%members%share%a%common%understanding%of%a%
problem%and%its%solution"%(Haas,%55)%"%(478)
○
Epistemic%Community%Hypothesis•
Differences%in%influence%allow%stronger%actors%the%greater%role%in%
organizing%the%system;%cooperation%here%is%closer%to%the%imposed%
variety%than%to%the%tacit%or%negotiated%forms%of%the%preceding%
hypotheses
§
Imbalances%in%power%-- often%in%the%form%of%hierarchies%-- are%conducive%to%
cooperation,%an%argument%that%resembles%hegemonic%stability%theory
○
Power%Asymmetries%Hypothesis•
"THE&RECENT&LITERATURE&ON&INTERNATIONAL&COOPERATION&HAS&THUS&
DEVELOPED&AT&LEAST&SIX&FAIRLY&POWERFUL&HYPOTHESES&TO&EXPLAIN&THE&
PHENOMENON.&THE&HYPOTHESES&TEND&TO&DERIVE&FROM&A&FEW&BASIC&
ASSUMPTIONS,&TO&FOCUS&ON&SYSTEMIC&OR&STRUCTURAL&VARIABLES,&AND&TO&
RELY&ON&GAME&THEORY.&EACH&OF&THESE&HYPOTHESES&HAS&ITS&OWN&
PROBLEMS&AND&HAS&ONLY&LIMITED&EMPIRICAL&SUPPORT.&NONETHELESS,&
THEY&AND&THE&UNDERLYING&COMMON&CONCEPTION&OF&COOPERATION&ARE&
THE&CENTRAL&ACHIEVEMENTS&OF&THIS&RECENT&LITERATURE."&(480)
•
First%problem%comes%from%the%assumption%used%to%generate%the%
relatively%parsimonious%hypotheses%(the%way%in%which%the%
assumption%of%anarchy%is%developed%causes%problems)
1)
Secondly,%the%literature%is%remarkable%in%its%neglect&of&domestic&
politics
2)
The&recent&literature&on&cooperation&suffers&from&at&least&two&serious&
drawbacks,&both&of&which&derive&from&its&reliance&on&SYSTEMIC&
THEORIES&and&GAME&THEORY
○
Their%inability%to%make%binding%agreements%and%to%communicate%
renders%the%game%tacit%-- or%noncooperative,%in%the%language%of%
game%theory
§
Axelrod,%Oye,%and%Grieco%all%share%%a%central%assumption:%states&exist&in&an&
anarchic&international&system
○
States%fear%for%their%lives1)
They%depend%only%upon%their%own%capabilities%to%survive2)
Changes%in%one's%capabilities%relative% to%other%states%are%a%state's%
central%concern
3)
States%will%not%accept%cooperative%agreements%that%are%relatively%
unfavorable%since%this%reduces%their%security
4)
Grieco:%in%an%anarchic%world…%(Hobbesian worldview%-->%states%are%always%
in%a%state%of%war%of%all%against%all)
○
Domestic%politics%tells%us%how%preferences%are%aggregated%and%
national%interests%constructed
1)
Domestic%politics%can%help%explain%the%strategies%states%adopt%
to%realize%their%goals
2)
Consideration%of%domestic%politics%seems%essential%for%
understanding%international%cooperation%for%three%reasons…
§
Pluralist%Theory1)
Elite%Theory2)
Institutional%Theory3)
Marxist%Theory4)
No%single%theory%of%domestic%politics%exists%today%to%explain%
international%cooperation.%Instead%there%are%four%prominent%
theories,%each%highlighting%different%factors.
§
Domestic%Politics
○
Weaknesses•
"While%cooperation%may%not%always%be%beneficial%depending%on%the%issue%
and%one's%vantage%point,%attempts%by%states%to%reduce%the%negative%effects%
of%their%policies%on%one%another%can%improve%the%general%welfare"%(495)
○
Issues%involving%actors%with%different%levels%of%capabilities%may%prove%more%
amendable%to%cooperative%agreement
○
In%striving%to%build%systemic%theories,%the%authors%begin%with%the%
assumption%of%anarchy%and%then%add%on%a%host%of%other%assumptions%
that%flow%from%the%fact%of%anarchy
1)
THUS,&FOR&ALL&THAT&SYSTEMIC&THEORY&HAS&BEEN&TOUTED&
FOR&ITS&SUPPOSED&EPISTEMOLOGICAL&PRIORITY&OR&
INHERENT&PARSIMONY,&THE&BIGGEST&GAINS&IN&
UNDERSTANDING&INTERNATIONAL&COOPERATION&IN&THE&
FUTURE&ARE&LIKELY&TO&COME&FROM&DOMESTIC&LEVEL&
THEORIES
□
The%literature% suffers%from%a%systemic%neglect%of%domestic%factors%--
even%while%it%depends%on%implicit% theories%about%internal%politics
2)
The%literature% also%has%at%least%two%weaknesses
○
Conclusion•
Helen%Milner%Reading
Tuesday,% March% 21,%2017
9:46%AM
International*Theories*of*Cooperation*Among*Nations
"This&academic&effort&has&been&sparked&in&part&by&the&increasingly&visible&
attempts&of&states&since&the&early&1970's&to&organize&cooperation&in&economic&
and&security&affairs"&(466)
•
Prisoner's&dilemma&(PD)&has&proliferated&as&the&KEY&metaphor&of&
international&politics
§
Uses%game%theory%as%central%tool%of%analysis
○
THIS&REVIEW&ARGUES&THAT&THESE&METHODOLIGICAL&CHOICES&HAVE&
CONTRIBUTED&TO&BOTH&THE&GREATEST&STRENGTHS&AND&WEAKNESSES&
OF&THE&LITERATURE&IN&EXPLAINING&COOPERATION&AMONG&NATIONS
○
IR%literature%regarding%cooperation%has%tended%to%focus%on%the%sources%of%and%
constraints%on%cooperative%behavior%among%states%as%a%function%of%the%
international%system
•
Policy&coordination then%implies%that%the%policies%of%each%
state%have%been%adjusted%to%reduce%their%negative%
consequences%for%the%other%states
□
COOPERATION:&"when%actors%adjust%their%behavior%to%the%actual%or%
anticipated%preferences%of%others,%through%a%process%of%policy%
coordination"%(467)
§
Robert&Keohane&helped%create%a%common%definition%of%the%phenomenon%
of%international%cooperation
○
But%does%assume%rational%behavior%for%allA)
Assumes%each%actor's%behavior%is%directed%toward%some%goal%
(doesn't%need%to%be%the%same%goal%for%all%actors%involved)
1)
The%gains%don't%have%to%be%the%same%in%magnitude%or%kind%for%
each%state,%but%must%be%mutual
A)
Each%actor%helps%the%other%to%realize% their%goal%by%adjusting%its%
policies%in%the%anticipation%of%its%own&reward
B)
The%actors%aren't%out%to%necessarily%help%the%others,%but%it%is%
the%anticipation%of%bettering%one's%own%situation%that%leads%to%
the%adjustment%in%one's%policies
C)
Cooperation%provides%the%actors%with%gains%or%rewards2)
Cooperation%is%opposed%to%conflict%or%competition,%which%
implies%goal-seeking%behavior%that%strives%to%reduce%the%gains%
available%to%others%or%to%impede%their%want-satisfaction
□
What%is%not%cooperation?
§
Cooperation
○
Unilateral&behavior:%actors%do%not%take%account%of%the%effects%of%
their%actions%on%others
§
Inactivity
§
Alternatives%to%Cooperation
○
"WHAT&COUNTS&AS&COOPERATION&THUS&DEPENDS&ON&THE&TWO&
ELEMENTS&MENTIONED&ABOVE:&GOAL-DIRECTED&BEHAVIOR&THAT&
ENTAILS&MUTUAL&POLICY&ADJUSTMENTS&SO&THAT&ALL&SIDES&END&UP&
BETTER& OFF&THAN&THEY&WOULD&OTHERWISE&BE"&(468)
○
Keohane,%Kenneth%Oye,%Joseph%Grieco,%Peter%Hass%all%employ%the%same%
defintion
○
Tacit:%occur%without%communication%or%explicit% agreement%
(Prisoner's&Dilemma)
1)
Haas%looks%to%explain%cooperation%by%examining%the%
impact%of%ideas%and%learning%promoted%by%a%cohesive%
scientific%community
a)
Negotiated:%most%common%type%of%cooperation
2)
If%the%stronger%party%also%adjusts%its%own%policies%and%
attempts%to%realize% mutual%gains,%cooperation%has%
occurred%
a)
Imposed:%the%stronger%party%in%a%relationship%can%force%the%
other%side%to%alter%its%policies
3)
How%can%you%achieve%cooperation?
§
Conditions%under%which%cooperation%is%likely%to%occur
§
Cooperation&
○
Strengths•
States%cooperate%in%order%to%realize%absolute%gains
○
Cooperating%in%the%PD%situation%is%their%preferred%strategy
□
Due%to%cheating%and%the%inability%to%sanction%it,%the%optimal%
way%to%achieve%absolute%gains%is%by%using%a%Tit-for-Tat%
approach%to%induce%mutual%cooperation
□
Axelrod:%states%seem%to%maximize%their%utility
§
Axelrod,%Keohane%argue%that%cooperative%behavior%is%more%likely%
when%states%pursue%a%strategy%of%reciprocity,%because%they%know%
that%they%will%be%punished%for%defecting%and%rewarding%for%
cooperating
§
Game%Theorists:%key%element%associated%with%reciprocity%are%
sanctioning%and%iteration
§
Concern&for&relative&gains&is&thus&likely&to&impede&
cooperation
®
Cooperation%is%much%more%difficult%when%all%sides%can%achieve%
absolute%gains,%because%no%state%wants%to%realize%fewer%
absolute%gains%than%any%other
□
Fear%of%cheating%or%fear%of%strengthening%the%
other?
◊
What%leads%to%this%desire%for%balance?
®
Grieco's%book%is%mostly%about%how%cooperation%should%never%
occur,%however%he%does%identify%one%condition%that%promotes%
it:%the&achievement&of&a&balanced&distribution&of&gains
□
Grieco:%argues%that%states%also%pursue%relative%gains,%always%seeking%
to%compare%their%absolute%gains%with%those%of%other%states
§
Economic%Reasoning:%states%act%rationally%to%increase%the%net%benefits%
they%receive
○
Equal%absolute%gains%imply%no%relative%changes%if%and%only%if%the%
states%are%equivalent%in%all%aspects
§
Proportional%absolute%gains%imply%no%relative%change%-->%the%closest%
to%the%notion%of%reciprocity%as%commonly%used
§
Balanced%vs.%Equal%Gains
○
Grieco:%criticizes% that%he%neglects%how%the%net%benefits%of%
collaboration%are%distributed%among%the%players
§
Axelrod:%exchange%is%balanced,%payoffs%to%the%players%are%symmetric
○
Absolute%Gains,%Relative%Gains,%and%Reciprocity%Hypotheses
•
Defection&problem:%large%numbers%increase%the%probability%of%
defection%and%reduce%the%feasibility%of%sanctioning%defectors
§
If%one%is%concerned%about%cheating,%a%larger%number%of%
players%may%be%better%since%it%provides%more%
opportunities%for%exchanges%and%side-payments
1)
Can%be%broken%down%into%situations%involving%
smaller%numbers
i)
The%number%of%actors%may%not%be%a%structural%condition%
but%rather%may%be%a%strategic%one%that%can%be%
manipulated%by%the%actors%themselves
2)
More%dangerous%to%suffer%a%loss%in%a%world%with%
fewer%actors%than%in%one%with%more%players
i)
Recent%work%in%game%theory%shows%that%the%possibility%
of%cooperation%in%a%relative%gains%environment%can%be%
enhanced%by%increasing%the%number%of%players
3)
Challenges%to%this%theory:%□
TWO&IS&THE&IDEAL&NUMBER&OF&PLAYERS
§
Hypothesis:&"the&prospects&for&cooperation&diminish&as&the&number&of&
players&increases"%(473)
○
Numbers%of%Actors%Hypothesis•
A%third%hypothesis%explaining%cooperation%focuses%on%the%players'%
expectations%about%the%future%%-->%their%willingness%to%cooperate%is%
influenced%by%whether%they%believe% they%will%continue%to%interact%
indefinitely
○
Many%have%shown%that%adding%repeated%play%(ITERATION) to%the%PD%game%
makes%the%cooperative%outcome%more%likely%
○
Iteration%Hypothesis•
Mitigate%the%effects%of%international%anarchy%for%states%by%aiding%in%
the%decentralized%enforcement%of%agreements
§
Regimes%facilitate%cooperation%through%the%functions%they%perform%for%
states
○
International%Regimes%Hypothesis•
Haas:%"the%strength%of%cooperative%arrangements%will%be%
determined%by%the%domestic%power%amassed%by%
members%of%the%epistemic%community%within%their%
respective%governments"%(479)
®
But%Haas%does%not%see%it%this%way%-->%instead,%it%should%initiate%
cooperation%by%spreading%its%common%understanding%of%an%
issue%
□
The%existence% of%an%epistemic%community%would%seem%in%this%view%
to%be%a%prerequisite%for%cooperation
§
Such%a%community%is%"a%professional%group%that%believes%in%the%same%
cause-and-effect%relationships,%truth%tests%to%accept%them,%and%shares%
common%values;%its%members%share%a%common%understanding%of%a%
problem%and%its%solution"%(Haas,%55)%"%(478)
○
Epistemic%Community%Hypothesis•
Differences%in%influence%allow%stronger%actors%the%greater%role%in%
organizing%the%system;%cooperation%here%is%closer%to%the%imposed%
variety%than%to%the%tacit%or%negotiated%forms%of%the%preceding%
hypotheses
§
Imbalances%in%power%-- often%in%the%form%of%hierarchies%-- are%conducive%to%
cooperation,%an%argument%that%resembles%hegemonic%stability%theory
○
Power%Asymmetries%Hypothesis•
"THE&RECENT&LITERATURE&ON&INTERNATIONAL&COOPERATION&HAS&THUS&
DEVELOPED&AT&LEAST&SIX&FAIRLY&POWERFUL&HYPOTHESES&TO&EXPLAIN&THE&
PHENOMENON.&THE&HYPOTHESES&TEND&TO&DERIVE&FROM&A&FEW&BASIC&
ASSUMPTIONS,&TO&FOCUS&ON&SYSTEMIC&OR&STRUCTURAL&VARIABLES,&AND&TO&
RELY&ON&GAME&THEORY.&EACH&OF&THESE&HYPOTHESES&HAS&ITS&OWN&
PROBLEMS&AND&HAS&ONLY&LIMITED&EMPIRICAL&SUPPORT.&NONETHELESS,&
THEY&AND&THE&UNDERLYING&COMMON&CONCEPTION&OF&COOPERATION&ARE&
THE&CENTRAL&ACHIEVEMENTS&OF&THIS&RECENT&LITERATURE."&(480)
•
First%problem%comes%from%the%assumption%used%to%generate%the%
relatively%parsimonious%hypotheses%(the%way%in%which%the%
assumption%of%anarchy%is%developed%causes%problems)
1)
Secondly,%the%literature%is%remarkable%in%its%neglect&of&domestic&
politics
2)
The&recent&literature&on&cooperation&suffers&from&at&least&two&serious&
drawbacks,&both&of&which&derive&from&its&reliance&on&SYSTEMIC&
THEORIES&and&GAME&THEORY
○
Their%inability%to%make%binding%agreements%and%to%communicate%
renders%the%game%tacit%-- or%noncooperative,%in%the%language%of%
game%theory
§
Axelrod,%Oye,%and%Grieco%all%share%%a%central%assumption:%states&exist&in&an&
anarchic&international&system
○
States%fear%for%their%lives1)
They%depend%only%upon%their%own%capabilities%to%survive2)
Changes%in%one's%capabilities%relative% to%other%states%are%a%state's%
central%concern
3)
States%will%not%accept%cooperative%agreements%that%are%relatively%
unfavorable%since%this%reduces%their%security
4)
Grieco:%in%an%anarchic%world…%(Hobbesian worldview%-->%states%are%always%
in%a%state%of%war%of%all%against%all)
○
Domestic%politics%tells%us%how%preferences%are%aggregated%and%
national%interests%constructed
1)
Domestic%politics%can%help%explain%the%strategies%states%adopt%
to%realize%their%goals
2)
Consideration%of%domestic%politics%seems%essential%for%
understanding%international%cooperation%for%three%reasons…
§
Pluralist%Theory1)
Elite%Theory2)
Institutional%Theory3)
Marxist%Theory4)
No%single%theory%of%domestic%politics%exists%today%to%explain%
international%cooperation.%Instead%there%are%four%prominent%
theories,%each%highlighting%different%factors.
§
Domestic%Politics
○
Weaknesses•
"While%cooperation%may%not%always%be%beneficial%depending%on%the%issue%
and%one's%vantage%point,%attempts%by%states%to%reduce%the%negative%effects%
of%their%policies%on%one%another%can%improve%the%general%welfare"%(495)
○
Issues%involving%actors%with%different%levels%of%capabilities%may%prove%more%
amendable%to%cooperative%agreement
○
In%striving%to%build%systemic%theories,%the%authors%begin%with%the%
assumption%of%anarchy%and%then%add%on%a%host%of%other%assumptions%
that%flow%from%the%fact%of%anarchy
1)
THUS,&FOR&ALL&THAT&SYSTEMIC&THEORY&HAS&BEEN&TOUTED&
FOR&ITS&SUPPOSED&EPISTEMOLOGICAL&PRIORITY&OR&
INHERENT&PARSIMONY,&THE&BIGGEST&GAINS&IN&
UNDERSTANDING&INTERNATIONAL&COOPERATION&IN&THE&
FUTURE&ARE&LIKELY&TO&COME&FROM&DOMESTIC&LEVEL&
THEORIES
□
The%literature% suffers%from%a%systemic%neglect%of%domestic%factors%--
even%while%it%depends%on%implicit% theories%about%internal%politics
2)
The%literature% also%has%at%least%two%weaknesses
○
Conclusion•
Helen%Milner%Reading
Tuesday,% March% 21,%2017 9:46%AM
