PHIL 251 Chapter 17: Nagel
17 May 2016
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The good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only because of its willing, i. e. , it is good of itself. And, regarded for itself, it is to be esteemed incomparably higher than anything which could be brought about by it in favor of any inclination or even of the sum total of all inclinations. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither diminish nor augment this worth. Whether we succeed or fail in what we try to do nearly always depends to some extent on factors beyond our control. There are roughly four ways in which the natural objects of moral assessment are disturbingly subject to luck. One is the phenomenon of constitutive luck - the kind of person you are, where this is not just a question of what you deliberately do, but of your inclinations, capacities, and temperament.
