PHILOS 132 Chapter Notes - Chapter 1: Qualia, Mind, If And Only If
Document Summary
The representational thesis [r ]: (1) all mental facts are representational facts, and (2) all representational facts are facts about informational functions. R is supposed to provide a satisfying account of the qualitative, rst-person, aspect of our sensory and affective life -- distinguishing between what we experience (reality) and how we ex- perience it (appearance). Conceiving of the mind as the representational face of the brain. Chapter 1: the representational character of sense experience. My experience of an object is the totality of ways that object appears to me, and the way an object appears to me is the way my senses represent it. Experience is a special kind of representation -- a nonconceptual form of representation. A system, s, represents a property, f , iff s has the function of indicating (providing informa- tion about) the f of a certain domain of objects.
