PCJ260Y1 Chapter Notes - Chapter 12: Security Dilemma, Michael Nicholson, Mutual Assured Destruction
14 Apr 2018
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Michael nicholson, rationality and the analysis of international conflict, (cambridge university press, 1992), ch. How behave, 1 day affect next --> iterated, super-game. If actors stay in collaborative position, they can at any point continue to collaborate or defect, but once they defect, they cannot reverse to collaborative. Coveter may see status quo as unjust and therefore justify. Noncooperative position is also stable (neither will reverse to original cooperative position) Gradual reduction in tension: smaller game, if agreement is not honoured, the other will not lose much, played incrementally. Willingness to take risks makes any outcome possible. "mild" chicken: loss is small, readily recouped in super-game. "severe" defection cannot be recouped in any plausible set of iterations --> destruction of responding party. Short: term losses of punishment may be worthwhile to secure long-term compliance of opponent. System should not break down if both see defection only brings short-term gains. To deter in severe, make clear attack will be met.
