PHLC95H3 Chapter Notes -Qualia, Physicalism
Document Summary
Mind body problem: consciousness, particularly phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness) Experience represents the thing and the experience itself. Thus shifting attention serves as a foundation of knowledge of our own phenomenal states via introspection. Srv= weak because:1)experiencing an experience is not a matter of being conscious of the experience: does not fit the phenomenological facts. 3) driver case 4) content of exp. no single content; external directed content + self- referential content. Qualia freak view= introspection= awareness of token experience + phenomenal properties. Horgan and kriegel says its incoherent to suppose that one is having an experience of green but was aware of it as being reddish. To this tye, answers with a case of experience having some surface has a certain shade. He states that it is possible for this surface to appear to have a shade but in reality lack it. So t can lack the property yet appear to have it.
