PHIL 359 Chapter 3: Tentative Kripke Comments
27 Jul 2016
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Pursued logical forms equivalent in meaning to de ne (the f) and inde nite (an f) descriptions ( semantic equivalencies) Russell"s forms : the f and an f, but sometimes expressions of these forms are not descriptions and descriptions are not of this form. R"s proper names are de nite descriptions in disguise, pronouns: proxy for de nite descriptions. Existence claim, uniqueness claim and maximality claim. X is the entity denoted by the phrase c. Scope: wide (d. d. part of a complex phrase), narrow (d. d. not part of a complex phrase) F is g, there is only one f, any meaningful statement must be either true/false (i wonder if f is g? indeterminate? or true) Aside from the mere relationship of denotation between x and c, : attributive and de nite (this doesn"t actually address a aw in. Russell"s theory, donnellan is actually making another claim) Russell does not account for the referential use of expressions,
