Log in
HomeTextbook Notes300,000AU3,000

ECON1101 Chapter Notes - Chapter 11: Whistleblower, Nash Equilibrium, Strategic Dominance

22 views4 pages
tealwombat375
12 Nov 2020
School
UNSW, UNSW Sydney
Department
Economics
Course
ECON1101
Professor
Alberto Motta

For unlimited access to Textbook Notes, a Class+ subscription is required.

Document Summary

The 3 elements of a game include: players, possible strategies a, pay-offs. [1] cartels are a group of firms that conspire to coordinate production and pricing in an industry for the purpose of earning an economic profit. They only exist on the basis of an expectation for repeated games, visibility to punish and the ability to punish non cooperation. Australia"s whistle blower strategy attempts to reduce or eliminate cartels in the business environment. Nash equilibrium occurs in a game when each players strategy is their best choice given the other player"s strategies. Essentially no player has an incentive to change strategy. This image from wikipedia portrays the prisoners dilemma. In this example, the prisoners are unable to talk to each other in making their decision. Hence, they will both use their dominant strategy of betraying the other prisoner (confessing) as no matter what the other person chooses they will be better off by confessing.

Get access

Grade+20% off
$8 USD/m$10 USD/m
Billed $96 USD annually
Grade+
Homework Help
Study Guides
Textbook Solutions
Class Notes
Textbook Notes
Booster Class
40 Verified Answers
Class+
$8 USD/m
Billed $96 USD annually
Class+
Homework Help
Study Guides
Textbook Solutions
Class Notes
Textbook Notes
Booster Class
30 Verified Answers

Related Documents

ECON1101 Chapter Notes - Chapter 8: Pareto Efficiency, Solution Concept, Oligopoly
byzantiumlizard468
ECON1101 Lecture Notes - Lecture 7: Nash Equilibrium, Oligopoly, Root Mean Square
apricotmacaw832
ECON 20 Lecture Notes - Lecture 18: Marginal Cost, Nash Equilibrium, Marginal Revenue
amaranthgrasshopper262

Related Questions

Problem 1

In each of the three games shown below, let p be the probability that player 1 plays cooperates (and 1- p the probability that player 1 defects), and let q be the probability that Player 2 plays cooperates (and 1- q the probability that player 2 defects).

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Player 2

Player 1

cooperate

defect

cooperate

70,70

10,80

defect

80,10

40,40

Stag Hunt

Player 2

Player 1

cooperate

defect

cooperate

70,70

5,40

defect

40,5

40,40

Chicken

Player 2

Player 1

cooperate

defect

cooperate

70,70

50,80

defect

80,50

40,40

1. For each game, draw a graph with player 1’s best response function (choice of p as a function of q), and player 2’s best response function (choice of q as a function of p), with p on the horizontal axis and q on the vertical axis.

2. Using this graphs, find all the Nash equilibriums for the game, both pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibriums (if any). Label these equilibriums on the corresponding graph.

3. In those games that have multiple pure strategy Nash equilibriums, how do the expected payoffs from playing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium compare with the payoffs from playing the pure strategy Nash equilibriums? Which type of strategy (mixed or pure) would players prefer to play in these games?

Problem 2

Two people are involved in a dispute. Player 1 does not know whether player 2 is strong or weak; she assigns probability α to player 2 being strong. Player 2 is fully informed. Each player can either fight or yield. Each player obtains a payoff of 0 is she yields (regardless of the other person’s action) and a payoff of 1 if she fights and her opponent yields. If both players fight, then their payoffs are (-1; 1) if player 2 is strong and (1;-1) if player 2 is weak. The Bayesian game is the following, depending on the type of player 2:

Y

F

Y

F

Y

0, 0

0, 1

Y

0, 0

0, 1

F

1, 0

-1, 1

F

1, 0

1, -1

Player 2 is strong (α)

Player 2 is weak (1-α)

Player 2 is strong (α)










After writing all the strategies and payoffs in the same matrix, find the Bayesian Nash equilibriums, depending on the value of α (α ≤ 1/2 or α ≥1/2).



(Please show as much work as possible)

 

1. You are bidding in a second-price auction for a painting that you value at $800. You estimate that other bidders are most likely to value the painting at between $200 and $600. Which of these is likely to be your best bid?

a. $1,000

b. $800

c. $600

d. $400

 

2. Which of the following is true about different ways of conducting a private-value auction?

a. A first-price auction is strategically equivalent to a second-price auction.

b. A first-price auction is strategically equivalent to an English auction.

c. A second-price auction is strategically equivalent to an English auction.

d. None of the above

 

3. Suppose that five bidders with values of $500, $400, $300, $200, and $100 attend an oral auction. Which of these is closest to the winning price?

a. $500

b. $400

c. $300

d. $200

 

4. In the above auction, if the bidders with the first- and third-highest values ($500 and

$300) collude, which of these is closest to the winning price?

a. $500

b. $400

c. $300

d. $200

 

5. If a seller is concerned about collusion among bidders, which of the following changes to the auction, should the seller make?

a. Hold frequent, small auctions instead of infrequent large auctions.

b. Conceal the amount of winning bids.

c. Publically announce the name of each auction's winner.

d. Hold a second-price instead of a first-price auction.

 

6. You're holding an auction to license a new technology that your company has developed. One of your assistants raises a concern that bidders' fear of the winner's curse may encourage them to shade their bids. How might you address this concern?

a. Release your analyst's positive scenario for the technology's future profitability.

b. Release your analyst's negative scenario for the technology's future profitability.

c. Use an oral auction.

d. All of the above

 

7. In a first-price auction, you bid ________ your value, and in a second-price auction you bid _________ your value.

a. at; above

b. below; above

c. below; at

d. below; below

8. You hold an auction among three bidders. You estimate that each bidder has a value of either $16 or $20 for the item, and you attach probabilities to each value of 50%. What is the expected price? If two of the three bidders collude, what is the price?

9. In Sweden, firms that fail to meet their debt obligations are immediately auctioned off to the highest bidder. (There is no reorganization through Chapter 11 bankruptcy.) The current managers are often high bidders for the company. Why?

10. When a famous painting becomes available for sale, it is often known which museum or collector will be the likely winner. Yet, representatives of other museums that have no chance of winning are actively wooed by the auctioneer to attend anyway. Why?

 

11. The deities Mars and Venus often do battle to create the weather conditions on Earth. Venus prefers extreme temperatures (especially heat), while Mars prefers temperate conditions. The payoffs (expressed in Points of Wrath) are given below.

 

 

Venus

 

 

Warm

Chill

Mars

Warm

20 , 0

0 , 10

Chill

0 , 90

20 , 0

What is the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of the above game?

(Let p be the probability of "Warm" for Mars, and q the probability of "Warm" for Venus.)

a) p=9/10, q=1/2

b) p=1/2, q=1/10

c) p=1/2, q=1/2

d) p=1/10, q=1/10

Player 2

 

 

H

D

Player 1

H

0 , 0

4 , 1

D

1 , 4

2 , 2

 

12. The above game is the title of the hawk-dove game and used by evolutionary biologists to describe evolutionary processes. It is also used to model how a business should grow. In the above game, what is the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and mixed strategies.?

Assume the cost of producing the goods is zero and that each consumer will purchase each good as long as the price is less than or equal to value. Consumer values are the entries in the table.

 

Good 1

Good 2

Consumer A

$2,300

$1,700

Consumer B

$2,800

$1,200

 

13. Suppose the monopolist only sold the goods separately. What price will the monopolist charge for good 1 to maximize revenues for good 1?

a. $2,300

b. $2,800

c. $1,200

d. $1,700

14. What is the total profit to the monopolist from selling the goods separately?

a. $4,500

b. $6,300

c. $7,000

d. $6,000

15. What is a better pricing strategy for the monopolist? At this price, what are the total profits to the monopolist?

a. Bundle the goods at $2,800; Profits = $5,600

b. Bundle the goods at $4,000; Profits = $8,000

c. Charge $2,800 for good 1 and charge $1,700 for good 2; Profits = $4,500

 

d. Charging the lowest price for each good individually is the best pricing strategy; Profits = $7,000

 

16. The prisoners' dilemma is an example of

a. a sequential game.

b. a simultaneous game.

c.a shirking game.

d. a dating game

 

17. Nash equilibrium

a. is where one player maximizes his payoff, and the other doesn't.

b. is where each player maximizes his own payoff given the action of the other player.

c.is where both players are maximizing their total payoff.

d. is a unique prediction of the likely outcome of a game.

 

Question 11 One potential remedy to the tragedy of the commons is to: never allow a single individual to consume more than one percent of the common resource. criminalize the usage of common resources. allow individuals to use a common resource as long as they receive some benefit from doing so. place a common resource under private ownership. 4 points Question 12 As a result of a positional externality: contestants have a tendency to invest in a series of mutually offsetting investments in performance enhancement. there is generally an underinvestment in performance enhancement. the market price of performance enhancement materials is too high. the quality of performance in competitive situations is lower than the socially optimal level. 4 points Question 13 Which of the following statements is true regarding health insurance? Economics shows that all health related procedures should be free to individuals because the health of an individual is priceless. Total economic surplus would be larger if individuals faced an incentive to only use services when the benefit exceeds their costs. Health maintenance organizations provide an incentive for doctors to prescribe expensive nonessential services. First dollar insurance coverage has likely had very little to do with rising healthcare expenditures since World War II. 4 points Question 14 A strategy that yields a higher payoff no matter what the other players in the game choose is known as a: prisoner's strategy. dominated strategy. dominant strategy. Nash strategy. 4 points Question 15 Based on the diagram below, if the costs of hospital care are constant at $200 per day, and the individual does not incur any cost for each day for hospital care, then: the individual will stay 7 days and there will be no loss in economic surplus. the individual will stay 3 days and there will be no loss in economic surplus. the individual will stay 7 days and there will be lost economic surplus. the individual will stay 3 days and there will be lost economic surplus. 4 points Question 16 Economic research by Manning and colleagues suggests that people with deductible health insurance policies: spend substantially less on health care and have substantially worse health outcomes compared to people with first-dollar insurance coverage. spend substantially more on health care and have substantially better health outcomes compared to people with first-dollar insurance coverage. spend basically the same amount on health care and have substantially worse health outcomes compared to people with first-dollar insurance coverage. spend substantially less on health care and have no measurable difference in health outcomes compared to people with first-dollar insurance coverage. 4 points Question 17 An efficient program for reducing pollution is one for which: all polluters incur the same total costs of abatement. all polluters pay the same amount in taxes to the government. all polluters have the same marginal costs of abatement. all polluters reduce their emissions by the same amount. 4 points Question 18 Given the information on pollution abatement costs of the two firms shown below, which of the following is an efficient combination of pollution reduction? Quantity of pollution abatement Firm A's MC of abatement Firm B's MC of abatement 1 $30 $25 2 $35 $30 3 $40 $35 4 $45 $40 Firm A reduces by 1 ton and Firm B reduces by 1 ton. Firm A reduces by 2 tons and Firm B reduces by 3 tons. Firm A reduces by 4 tons and Firm B reduces by 1 ton. Firm A reduces by 3 tons and Firm B reduces by 2 tons. 4 points Question 19 All of the following are characteristics of perfectly competitive markets except: there are a large number of firms. productive resources are mobile. all firms produce a differentiated product. buyers and sellers are well informed. 4 points Question 20 An advantage of the auction method to pollution abatement is that: it is very expensive to firms. regulators can achieve a desired abatement target without having detailed knowledge of the abatement technologies available to polluters. it requires all firms to reduce by exactly the same amount. it assures that eventually society will reach a level of zero pollution emissions. 4 points Question 21 There are 2 firms each emitting 200 tons of a pollutant. Firm A's abatement costs are constant at $20/ton, and Firm B's abatement costs are constant at $40/ton. The government's goal is to reduce pollution by half. If the government auctions 200 one ton permits to the highest bidder: Firm A will purchase all 200 permits. Firm B will purchase all 200 permits. each firm will buy 100 tons. there is no way to know who the highest bidder for any permit would equal. 4 points Question 22 As a result of economies of scale, as output expands: fixed costs are decreasing. average total costs are decreasing. marginal costs are increasing. total costs are decreasing. 4 points Question 23 Generally, when countries open their borders to free trade: both domestic producers and consumers of imported goods gain. both domestic producers and consumers of exported goods gain. domestic producers of imported goods and domestic consumers of exported goods gain. domestic producers of exported goods and domestic consumers of imported goods gain. 4 points Question 24 Which of the following is the best example of a tariff? South Korea bans imports of U.S. beef because of safety concerns. The U.S. requires toys imported from China to undergo testing for lead content. The U.S. imposes a tax on sugar imported from Brazil. The U.S. restricts the quantity of cars imported from Japan. 4 points Question 25 A means-tested program is a benefit program: in which benefits decline as a recipient's earned income increases. in which all individuals must undergo health screening to be eligible for benefits. in which all recipients exclusively receive benefits through in-kind transfers. that only affects the average income of a specific segment of the population. 4 points Save and Submit Click Save and Submit to save and submit. Click Save All Answers to save all answers.