PHIL 212 Study Guide - Fall 2018, Comprehensive Midterm Notes - Thought Experiment, Structural Functionalism, Qualia
12 Oct 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
PHIL 212
MIDTERM EXAM
STUDY GUIDE
Fall 2018
Philosophy of Mind 8.29.17 Lecture Notes – Cartesian Dualism
- Mind/Body problem – how does the mind relate to the body?
- Is the mind reducible to the brain?
- Problem of Mental Representation: How can my thoughts represent (be about) objects
in the external world?
- Problem of Free Will: Can we freely choose our own actions or are actions wholly
determined by antecedent causes?
- Physicalism/Materialism: the view that the mind is part of the physical world
- Dualism: the view that the mind is not part of the physical world – it is something extra
that extends beyond the realm of physics
- Mental state: any sort of mental happening
o Ex: beliefs, desires, pains, itches, the experience of seeing red, etc.
Cartesian Dualism
- Two kinds of substances – physical substances and mental substances
o The body is a physical substance
o The mind is a mental substance (something like a soul)
o They can still causally interact with one another
- Minds exist out of the physical universe – do’t ee take up spae
- Descartes imagines a sort of separate mental, non-material realm existing alongside the
physical universe
- Mental/physical interaction
o Can causally interact with one another
o Immaterial thoughts can cause physical body to do things
- Descartes hypothesized that the pineal gland was the interface between the mind and
the brain
- Descartes provides several arguments for dualism – Leiiz’s La
o If m and b are identical, then they must have all the same properties.
o Identity requires exact sameness
- Properties – features of objects
- Argument #1: Argument from Divisibility
o 1. My id is’t diisile.
▪ Descartes believed that my experiences cannot be cut up, for instance.
▪ Counterexamples can be experiments with split-brain patients
o 2. My brain is divisible.
o 3. Leiiz’s La
o 4. Therefore, my mind is distinct from my brain.
o The argument begs the question – the 1st premise assumes the mind is
immaterial
- Argument #2: Argument from Indubitability
o 1. I a’t dout that I hae a id.
▪ I think, therefore I am.
▪ Doubting is a mental act
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
o 2. I can doubt that I have a brain.
o 3. Leiiz’s la
o 4. Therefore, my mind is distinct from my brain.
- Another way to get around this argument (in Sober)
o Indubitability is not a genuine property
o The argument has to be the way Lois Lane feels about the object – not a feature
of the object itself
o Beig or ot eig the ojet of Lois Lae’s desire is’t really a property of
Superman/Clark Kent
o Beig doutale is’t really a property of ojets either
o The issues concern so-called intentional properties (being desired by x, being
hated by x) – ot real properties, so Leiiz’s la does ot apply to the
- We’e sho that Desartes arguets are ad arguets, ut e hae ot disproed
his view
- Other problems with Cartesian dualism
o Problem of Interaction: How can the mind and body interact if the mind is
immaterial?
o How can an immaterial entity produce physical effects?
o Causal interactions between the physical body and immaterial, non-spatial mind
in a separate realm very shaky
- Causal Exclusion Argument
o Argument designed to show that mental states are physical in nature
o It looks like all out actions have sufficient physical causes, what do we gain by
positing extra mental ones (refer to the picture that looks like a triangle)
o Papineau, 17 – the little blurb talking about how physical causes and mental
causes cannot cause an effect twice over
- Mental cause – thirst
- But… also suffiiet physial ause: the physial proesses i rais ad eres
- Effect – getting beer
- 1. Claim that the mental and physical causes are separate and the effect is being caused
twice over (what dualists would have to adopt) or 2. Say that the mental cause and
physical cause is identical (what Papineau believes)
- Formal argument in his paper
- Premise 1 – conscious mental occurrences have physical effects
- Premise 2 – every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause
o Not exhaustively proven, but inductively makes sense and is assumed in science
- Premise 3 – saying that the physical effect cannot have overdetermined causes
o You can challenge this premise
o The etal ause is redudat ut hat’s rog ith that?
o The argument, if you reject premise 3, will still be coherent
- Conclusion – conscious mental causes must be identical to physical causes
- Mai poit: I ases of itetioal atio, there a’t e BOTH a suffiiet etal ause
for our action AND a sufficient physical cause for our action
- Therefore, physicalism must be true
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
Philosophy of mind 8. 29. 17 lecture notes cartesian dualism. Problem of mental representation: how can my thoughts represent (be about) objects. Physicalism/materialism: the view that the mind is part of the physical world. Dualism: the view that the mind is not part of the physical world it is something extra that extends beyond the realm of physics. Mental state: any sort of mental happening: ex: beliefs, desires, pains, itches, the experience of seeing red, etc. Two kinds of substances physical substances and mental substances: the body is a physical substance, the mind is a mental substance (something like a soul, they can still causally interact with one another. Minds exist out of the physical universe do(cid:374)"t e(cid:448)e(cid:374) take up spa(cid:272)e. Descartes imagines a sort of separate mental, non-material realm existing alongside the physical universe. Mental/physical interaction: can causally interact with one another. Immaterial thoughts can cause physical body to do things.
