4. Pareto Optimal Allocation and Competitive Equilibrium with Proportional Income Tax . Consider an economy with the representative consumer, representative firm, and government. For simplicity, suppose that G = 0. The consumerâs preferences over the consumption good and leisure are given by the utility function U(C, l) = 2 ln C + ln l. Let h = 18. The firmâs production function is Y = zK1/2N1/2 , where z = 2 and K = 1.
(a) Write down the social plannerâs maximization problem and the social plannerâs optimality condition. (Recall: MRSl,C = âU/âl âU/âC and MPN = âzF(K, N)/âN.)
(b) Derive the Pareto optimal allocation for leisure, labor, output, and consumption.
(c) Suppose the government imposes a proportional income tax t = .5 on the representative consumer, and distributes the revenue back to them as a lump-sum transfer (subsidy). That is, the consumerâs budget constraint is c = w(1 â t)(h â l) + Ï + S, where S is the subsidy. Compute the amount of labor in the competitive equilibrium, and show how it compares to the one you found in part (b).
4. Pareto Optimal Allocation and Competitive Equilibrium with Proportional Income Tax . Consider an economy with the representative consumer, representative firm, and government. For simplicity, suppose that G = 0. The consumerâs preferences over the consumption good and leisure are given by the utility function U(C, l) = 2 ln C + ln l. Let h = 18. The firmâs production function is Y = zK1/2N1/2 , where z = 2 and K = 1.
(a) Write down the social plannerâs maximization problem and the social plannerâs optimality condition. (Recall: MRSl,C = âU/âl âU/âC and MPN = âzF(K, N)/âN.)
(b) Derive the Pareto optimal allocation for leisure, labor, output, and consumption.
(c) Suppose the government imposes a proportional income tax t = .5 on the representative consumer, and distributes the revenue back to them as a lump-sum transfer (subsidy). That is, the consumerâs budget constraint is c = w(1 â t)(h â l) + Ï + S, where S is the subsidy. Compute the amount of labor in the competitive equilibrium, and show how it compares to the one you found in part (b).