(B) What is the expected value of the game for R if the bank Ralways chooses TV and bank C uses its optimum strategy?
E= _____ (type fully reduced fraction or mixed number)
(C) What is the expected value of the game for R if the bank Calways chooses radio and bank R uses its optimum strategy?
E= _____ (type fully reduced fraction or mixed number)
(D) What is the expected value of the game for R if both banksalways use the paper?
E= ____ (Enter an integer or decimal. Round to two decimalplaces)
A town has only two banks, R and C, and both compete about equally for the town's business. Each week each bank decides on the use of one of the following means of promotion: TV, radio, newspaper, and mail. A marketing research firm provided the following payoff matrix, which indicates the percentage of market gain or loss for each choice of action by R and by C (we assume that any gain by R is a loss by C. and vice versa): Find the optimal strategy P*. Hint: if a row was deleted, the probability of choosing that row is zero. P * = [ ] (Type fully-reduced fractions or mixed numbers. ) Find the optimal strategy Q *. Hint: if a column was deleted, the probability of choosing that column is zero. (Type fully-reduced fractions or mixed numbers. ) What is the value v of the game? v = (type a fully-reduced fraction or mixed number)
