INTL 4440 Lecture Notes - Lecture 2: World Trade Organization

• School: University of Georgia
• Department: International Affairs
• Course: INTL 4440
• Professor: Danny Hill

Document Summary

Prisoner"s dilemma: there is a huge payoff incentive to defect or tell on other prisoner, there is a benefit to cheating on agreement. Even in pd, cooperation is possible: repeated prisoner"s dilemma, shadow of the future , reciprocal strategies, reputation. How institutions help: prmotoe repeated interaction, information makes reciprocity easier, information affects reputation, linkage (actors and issues) Example: wto, trade agreements w/ human rights clauses. Does call attention to distributional issues- how the pie is divided. Realism: cooperation is hard or impossible, institutions do little to solve the problem. Liberalism: no it isn"t, repeated pd gives us a reason to believe, institutions can help. Most cooperative interactions have the same structure: bargaining- divide the pie, enforcement- cooperate or defect (pd) Shadow of the future makes enforcement easier, bargaining harder: the idea that the future is important because you will probably run into people in the future. Conventional wisdom: pd harder than stag hunt. But, there are multiple equilibria in coordination.