POLI 12 Lecture Notes - Lecture 18: Bargaining, Security Dilemma
Lecture 18:
Why do states go to war?
This is a puzzle because war is costly, in terms of human cost and the cost of weapons and military
and the economy. There is almost always a less costly alternative, so why do they still happen? The
most widely accepted theory is (according to realism) that there is anarchy in the international
system. There is no large, overarching legal or judicial system to oversee how states interact
.
Classic theories:
• Realism: In anarchy, states strive to maximize their relabel power and enhance their security. So if
states will be better off if they can balance the powers of other states that are building up their
arsenals. They also argue that states have an incentive to maximize their power. They essentially
want to balance their power and keeping their adversaries in check, this can cause a spiral known
as the security dilemma. This is the fundamental framework behind realist theories.
• Misperception: Leaders often when they make decisions about whether or not to go to war they can
misestimate how likely they are to win the war or how much it’ll cost them. We don’t know how
willing countries are to fight back or what their resolve is. It is hard to judge the likelihood and so
this does not entirely explain war as misperceptions are common while wars are not.
• Domestic politics: Costs don’t fall on actors that call the shots.
These approaches haven’t been effective at explaining why wars break out in some instance but not
in others leading to the bargaining theory.
Bargaining Model:
• There’s always some arrangement that states prefer to war as war entails cots. States prefer any deal
that give them war not net, when costs are taken into account. Bargaining essentially happens as
states want to improve their status.
Threats:
• If states can improve their situation through war, relative to their status quo leading them to make
threats
• Compellent: Compel others to make cessions, make them change their course of action to doing
what you want.
• Deterrent: Deter others from taking actions against you to improve their states.
Incomplete information:
These scenarios can lead to war because of incomplete information:
Even though states might prefer to avoid war, states don’t know others capabilities to follow though
on threats. States also don’t know the resolve of other states or how determined they are to follow
through. E.g. the Korean War, the Chinese government pledged to support North Korea in an
informal memo which wasn’t taken very seriously by the US, but China did intervene and then the
US was drawn into the war. If you don’t believe what the other side is saying or can do, you may bee
more likely to invade or seize advantages for yourself.
Bargaining with incomplete information:
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
This is a puzzle because war is costly, in terms of human cost and the cost of weapons and military and the economy. The most widely accepted theory is (according to realism) that there is anarchy in the international system. There is no large, overarching legal or judicial system to oversee how states interact. Classic theories: realism: in anarchy, states strive to maximize their relabel power and enhance their security. So if states will be better off if they can balance the powers of other states that are building up their arsenals. They also argue that states have an incentive to maximize their power. They essentially want to balance their power and keeping their adversaries in check, this can cause a spiral known as the security dilemma. We don"t know how willing countries are to fight back or what their resolve is.
