ECON 101 Lecture Notes - Lecture 11: Bayerischer Rundfunk, Best Response
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If (cid:1829)=(cid:883), (cid:2870)=(cid:885), then which of these is a br for player 1: (cid:2869)=(cid:883, (cid:2869)=(cid:885, (cid:2869)=(cid:884, (cid:2869)=(cid:885) . Option d is the correct answer for this question (cid:1869)(cid:2869)(cid:4666)(cid:4667)=(cid:884)(cid:882) (cid:883)(cid:884), (cid:1869)(cid:2870)(cid:4666)(cid:4667)=(cid:884)(cid:888) (cid:883)(cid:884) (cid:1829)(cid:4666)(cid:1869)(cid:4667)=(cid:886)(cid:1869)(cid:2870)+(cid:883)(cid:884)(cid:1869)(cid:2870) Cost function is not linear i. e. ac and mc are not constant. (i) There are 10000 people in the population, each of whom is willing to pay at most for one unit of the good. Currently, both firms have (cid:1865)(cid:1829)=(cid:1827)(cid:1829)=(cid:887) (a) thinking about this scenario as a game. Question: suppose one firm adopt a technology that reduces its (cid:1865)(cid:1829) and (cid:1827)(cid:1829) to 3. How much is fir one willing to pay for this technology? (i) (ii) Players: {(cid:1858)(cid:1870)(cid:1865)(cid:883),(cid:1858)(cid:1870)(cid:1865) (cid:884)} (cid:1845){, [(cid:882), (cid:4667)},(cid:1829) {(cid:883),(cid:884)} ((cid:1828)(cid:1844),(cid:4666)(cid:2870)(cid:4667))[for same player ] (cid:1828)(cid:1844)(cid:2869)(cid:4666)(cid:2870)(cid:4667)=(cid:883)(cid:882), [(cid:887), (cid:4667), (cid:4666)(cid:2870),(cid:4667) (cid:2870) , (cid:887)(cid:883)(cid:882), (cid:2870)=(cid:887) whrn captures with =(cid:882) or not captures. Firm one undercuts firm two at a price where it is unprofitable for two to undercut price. (b) equilibrium (c)