PHIL 001 Lecture Notes - Lecture 13: Cell Growth, Dutch National Cycle Routes, Brain Transplant
3 Jun 2018
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Week 9A – Personal Identity and Personhood
PHILOSOPHY
Outline:
- Who Am I?
- Kinds of Identity
- The Soul
- Identity and Continuity
- Psychological Continuity
- Pros and Cons of Psychological Continuity
- Identity, Fission, and Duplication
Personal identity
What ‘defines’ who you as a particular individual
1. What shaped you (culture, family, region, etc.)
2. What you ‘identify as’ or ‘endorse’ again as culture, roles, religion, etc.)
3. The values, convictions, and motivations that are most ‘central’ to you
a. (akin to Deep Self)
This is ‘substantial’ personal identity
Personal identity – structural
Philosophy is primarily interested in structural aspects of personal identity
1. kind of membership: which kind of entity are we?
a. Human being? Persons? Immaterial substances?
2. Identity at a time: what makes a particular individual different from another one?
a. Body, mind, self, soul?
3. Identity over time: what makes a particular individual the same person over time?
Clicker Question
Consider the following cases:
1. A body transplant
2. A brain transplant
3. The permanent loss of all past memories
In which of these scenarios do you think you would die and another person(s) take your place?
a. None
b. 1 only
c. 2 only
d. 3 only
e. 1 & 2
f. 2&3
g. 1 &3
h. all
All these cases raise questions about
Your identity over time
It is no surprise that there is no clear consensus!
Because many factors are at play – lets start to sort the out
Preliminary Distinctions
Ambiguity in ‘identity’ or ‘sameness’
- ‘I dive the same car as you do’, ‘My car is identical to yours’
Possible interpretations:
1. My car is the same make and model as yours
2. My car is exactly similar to yours (a perfect copy)
Week 9A – Personal Identity and Personhood
PHILOSOPHY
3. There is only one car, which we both drive
Qualitative vs Numerical identity
In 1& 2 → qualitative sameness/identity
In 3 → numerical identity
Numerical identity
If A & B are numerically identical there is just one thing, which is both A and B
- Clark Kent is numerically identical to Superman
‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are two ways to refer to one and the same person
Numerical identity over time
Is person A at time T1 one and the same person as B at the different time T2?
- Is 30 year old superman = 10 year old Clark Kent?
- S30 = CK10?
The answer would be straightforward YES, if there had been no change at all.
But usually there is change over time
How much change, if any, is compatible with preservation of identity
Standard answer: identity is preserved only when the change is in non-essential properties.
For instance
- The Mona Lisa continues to exist if we change the frame or remove a small speck of pigment
But it is destroyed if we remove all the oil, leaving only the popular panel
If we remove all the oil, leaving only the popular panel
- S30 = CK10 if the changes only affect CK’s inessential properties
For instance, his hairs or nails, his passing thoughts and urges, etc.
But what is essential to us?
Is there an essential core of a person whose change equals to permanent loss of identity, i.e., death?
(even if another person might be thereby come into existence)
Initial proposals
Fingerprints
- We rely on them as reliable evidence of identity but not essential losing them is not to disappear or die
DNA
- Often distinctive of particular individuals (like fingerprints) but twins, clones, and chimeras
- Is continuity of DNA (in a single cell? In multiple cells?) same as continuity of individual existence?
more promising proposal
the soul, the persistence and unchangeable substance
Properties of the Soul
1. Unchangeable → no problem of change
2. Persistent (potentially immortal)
3. Makes one the particular person one is
4. Explains what is special about us as persons
Document Summary
Consider the following cases: a body transplant, a brain transplant, the permanent loss of all past memories. In which of these scenarios do you think you would die and another person(s) take your place: none, 1 only, 2 only, 3 only, 1 & 2, 2&3, 1 &3, all. It is no surprise that there is no clear consensus! Because many factors are at play lets start to sort the out. I dive the same car as you do", my car is identical to yours". Possible interpretations: my car is the same make and model as yours, my car is exactly similar to yours (a perfect copy) Week 9a personal identity and personhood: there is only one car, which we both drive. If a & b are numerically identical there is just one thing, which is both a and b. Clark kent is numerically identical to superman.
