PHI 101 Lecture Notes - Lecture 17: Explanatory Gap, Qualia, Physicalism

• School: University at Buffalo
• Department: Philosophy
• Course: PHI 101
• Professor: Powell Lewis

Document Summary

Minds and bodies phi 101 lecture 17 (cid:862)it (cid:373)ust (cid:271)e (cid:272)o(cid:374)fessed that pe(cid:396)(cid:272)eptio(cid:374) a(cid:374)d that (cid:449)hi(cid:272)h depe(cid:374)ds upo(cid:374) it a(cid:396)e i(cid:374)e(cid:454)pli(cid:272)a(cid:271)le o(cid:374) (cid:373)e(cid:272)ha(cid:374)i(cid:272)al g(cid:396)ou(cid:374)ds, that is to sa(cid:455), (cid:271)(cid:455) (cid:373)ea(cid:374)s of figu(cid:396)es a(cid:374)d (cid:373)otio(cid:374)s. (cid:863) leibniz. An overview of the debate between dualists and physicalists. Ka(cid:396)e(cid:374) be(cid:374)(cid:374)et(cid:859)s (cid:862)wh(cid:455) i a(cid:373) (cid:374)ot a dualist(cid:863) (cid:894)(cid:1006)(cid:1004)(cid:1004)6(cid:895) Dualism, in the philosophy of mind, is a position about the nature of the mind, but as such, a dualist of this sort also holds a metaphysical view about the questions in the previous slide. A dualist thinks that the basic furniture of the world does not consist in only physical entities. Different dualists may give different accounts of the mind, appealing to different sorts of non- physical entities to explain its existence and nature. Dualists might also differ in their views on the relationship between the physical and the non- physical.