ECON 151 Lecture Notes - Lecture 23: Human Capital, Marginal Utility, Opportunity Cost

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22 Nov 2020
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Employer gonna pay everyone at the average (w* = 2-p) between high and low productivity workers b/c they don"t know who is what type of worker. E(wx) = p x w1 + (1 - p) w2. = p + 1 - uhh = 1-p. Wages set at different levels at workers can discriminate on productivity. Signals allow workers to differentiate between high and low productivity. Worker 1 goes for e=0 with w1 = 1 and p=1-0=0. Worker 2 goes for e=e*, with p = 2 e /2. For worker 2, signaling is costly: she gets less. W1 and w2 are lower (or equal) with signaling (compared to perfect info) . : no social than in the perfect info case. gain from signaling. W1 making less than before (so hurt by signaling) But the sum of the two gains = no gains. Signaling just make the society more fair i. e. higher productivity workers get higher wages.

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