CPO-2002 Lecture Notes - Lecture 15: Ideal Point, Homo Economicus, Pareto Efficiency
21 Apr 2016
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Chapter 11: problems with group decision making (continued) . There are an odd number of voters. Then, the proposal matching the ideal point of the median voter will defeat all other alternatives. Problems: when moving from primary to general, Voter turnout is lower: chaos theorem: if there are two or more issue dimensions and three or more voters with preferences in the issue space who all vote sincerely, there will be no. Except in the case of a rare distribution of ideal points! The unanimity (or pareto optimality) condition (p) Group choice should be unperturbed by changes in the rankings of irrelevant alternatives: ex. Everyone in your family prefers american idol to. Dancing with the stars and until recently, everyone preferred lost to the prime minister"s questions. But now that you"ve started studying comparative politics everyone prefers the prime minister"s questions to lost. (i) requires that everyone still prefers american idol to.
