POLSCI 329S Lecture Notes - Lecture 6: Autocracy, Median Voter Theorem, Collective Action
17 May 2018
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Department
Course
Professor
Politics of Violence 9.15.16 Lecture Notes
Civil War and Guerilla Warfare/Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
Wrapping up: state-building in Africa
Herbst
o State formation in pre-colonial Africa was different
o Colonialism is not the blame for everything
o Sovereignty is perceived in a dysfunctional way
▪ Importance of people v. territory
o Because no wars with other states for borders – no consolidation (back to Tilly)
Is warfare inevitable?
o Product of cooperation is failed states
The future of the state in Africa
o New national states?
▪ Redrawing borders?
• Would cause disputes over territories – not all groups can be satisfied
• Maybe lead to European intervention again
▪ More republics?
▪ Regional governments?
▪ Balance of power
o New forms of sovereignty?
State building and welfare
o Does having a strong state and strong institutions lead to provision of welfare?
o No, it will depend on:
▪ Type of regime: autocracy/democracy
▪ Type of government
o State, regime, government ALL DIFFERENT
o State – one unit, ex: US
o Regime – how power is organized within the state, ex: democracy, autocracy
o Government – you can different governments within a state – different ways of running the
country
▪ Level of taxation
Violence interacts with regime type
BOIX
o Democracy: there are free elections that are decisive for who runs
▪ Executive is directly or indirectly elected by the people and is directly accountable
to the people
▪ Majority of the population has the right to vote
o Autocracy: non-democracies
o Hybrid regimes?
▪ Governments where elections are not fully free, so on
Why do we have countries in the world that have democracies or autocracies?
OLSON
o Anarchy to autocracy
▪ Roving v. stationary bandits
▪ Roving bandit – you go around stealing from people
▪ Stationary bandits – you continue to rob the people who live in a region and you
have the incentive to invest in the people’s productivity so that you can tax more
• People prefer this option because they have the certainty that they will be
protected and will be productive
find more resources at oneclass.com
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Document Summary
Civil war and guerilla warfare/dictatorship, democracy, and development. The future of the state in africa: state formation in pre-colonial africa was different, colonialism is not the blame for everything, sovereignty is perceived in a dysfunctional way. The median voter is the decisive vote: median voter theory, this implies that different levels of inequality will lead to different levels of redistribution/taxation. A lot of poor, small rich: the rich will repress the vote, no incentive to build a democracy, cost of repression will be much lower than cost of democracy. A bell curve (most people in the middle: incentive for democracy, demand for redistribution will be lower, cost of repression is higher than cost of democracy. A lot of rich, small poor we don"t have societies like that. What may cause an autocracy to transition into a democracy very high because of high inequality: trade (changes in the value of assets, growth of middle class, foreign pressure.
