PHIL 3195 Lecture Notes - Lecture 9: Social Fact, De Minimis, Deontological Ethics

• School: York University
• Department: Philosophy
• Course: PHIL 3195
• Professor: Dale Mathew

Document Summary

The rights that criminals are said to violate cannot be legal rights, for we want to know why it is morally, not just legally, permissible to punish. But (cid:862)if it is (cid:373)o(cid:396)all(cid:455) pe(cid:396)(cid:373)issi(cid:271)le to pu(cid:374)ish people as lo(cid:374)g as the(cid:455) (cid:448)iolate a moral right, then rights forfeiture theory seems to recommend state punishment in at least three types of awkward (cid:272)ases(cid:863): (cid:1005). Whe(cid:374) so(cid:373)eo(cid:374)e is (cid:373)o(cid:396)all(cid:455) guilt(cid:455) (cid:271)ut legall(cid:455) i(cid:374)(cid:374)o(cid:272)e(cid:374)t; (cid:1006). Whe(cid:374) so(cid:373)eo(cid:374)e (cid:448)iolates a relatively inconsequential moral rights; and 3. Assuming that mass incarceration is unjust, chiao asks whether strictly deontological theories of punishment can explain its injustice. The problem with such theories, he argues, is that for them just institutions of punishment are (cid:862)(cid:449)holl(cid:455) a(cid:374)al(cid:455)za(cid:271)le i(cid:374) te(cid:396)(cid:373)s of justi(cid:272)e i(cid:374) i(cid:374)di(cid:448)idual t(cid:396)a(cid:374)sa(cid:272)tio(cid:374)s(cid:863) (cid:894)(cid:1006)(cid:895). Deontological theories are not necessarily retributive theories because strict deontological theories do not necessarily require retributive reasons.