PCJ260Y1 Lecture Notes - Peacebuilding, Security Dilemma, Zero-Sum Game
23 Apr 2013
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Women in house -> womeninhouse. uoft@gmail. com, feb 15 4pm. Strategic interactions actually matter; helps shed light on outcomes, actors may face unanticipated surprising results they weren"t expecting because of the features of the interaction themselves. 1) observation that peace building nations usually successful in ending violence but not effective in realizing possible peace (involving liberal reform; democracy and market) More responsive the two sides are (steeper slope), more unatstable the system. Final armamnet levels given by intersection of both lines. Reults can often be surprising because of features of system of interaction> unstable system, must be very careful. Once system in in equilibirum, impact of chaes in suspicion or responsiveness depens on whether stable or instable. In stable system, increased responsivess or suspicion gives rise to initial increase in arms until a new equilibirum is reached. Strong correlation between arms races ad war.
