R SOC365 Lecture Notes - Lecture 6: Labour Power, Nash Equilibrium, Institutional Analysis
Document Summary
Institutions, markets and political economy perspectives for environmental resources governance: Tragedy of commons game 1: nash equilibrium best response to what the other player"s expected move is. Prisoners" dilemma game 2: two agents a and b. But since all herdsmen enjoy the same incentive, the inevitable result is a destroyed pasture. A resource belonging to everyone, belongs to no one, and will inevitably be grazed to destruction. : incentive to defect or free ride is strong in environmental conservation. Way out of tragedy: conscience and goodwill are useless, coercion to control people"s behaviour, private property either through state or private control some kind of an enclosure was deemed necessary. Evidence of collective action: examples of management of dif cult to enclosure resources around the world. Montreal protocol: chlorine in cfcs (coolants, refrigerants) causes a hole in atmospheric ozone. !5: degree to which lessons from local scale commons are transferable to larger scale environmental issues.
