POLSCI 1AB3 Lecture Notes - Lecture 12: Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Proliferation, International Atomic Energy Agency
11 Apr 2018
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Document Summary
In many respect this is a critical case for proponent of nuclear deterrence. This was a case where it was least likely for nuclear deterrence theory to hold: Despite all the factors weighing against deterrence (and the fact that the conflict went right to the brink), in the end a full scale war was avoided. There are (cid:862)proliferatio(cid:374) opti(cid:373)ists(cid:863) a(cid:374)d (cid:862)proliferatio(cid:374) pessi(cid:373)ists(cid:863) (cid:272)ases as (cid:449)ell. If more states are armed with nuclear warheads, all states will have to be more cautious in their foreign policy. Proliferation pessimists: deterrence depend on certain assumptions that are unrealistic, even if we accept the logical persuasiveness of nuclear deterrence theory (and not everyone does), it does not necessarily follow that nuclear proliferation will result in increased security. Even if we accept the argument (hypothetically) that nuclear deterrence will prevent nuclear 99. 9% of the time. The potential consequence associated with a 0. 1% failure rate may more than overwhelm the potential benefits of years of stability.
