POLI 244 Lecture Notes - Lecture 17: Carl Von Clausewitz, Hegemony, Brinkmanship
19 Jun 2018
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Why are there wards?
The puzzle of war
War is costly
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Blood and treasure
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States would rather get what they want without going to war
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"in war, the aggressor is always peace-loving, he would prefer
to take over our country unopposed" - Karl von Clausewitz
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War as bargaining failure
Bargaining (territory, national policy)
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Crisis bargaining
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Coercive diplomacy
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"do what I ask or else!"
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War from incomplete information
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Wars are costly but there is always a peaceful bargain to stop
countries from going to war
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What states fight over
National policy
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Regime type
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Why are there wars?
•The puzzle of war
•War as a bargaining failure
•War from incomplete information
Given that wars are costly, there is always a peaceful bargain that would be the better
option than going to war for both states.
War:
•Number of states engaged in interstate wars have been reduced significantly
◦Even though number of states has increased significantly
•Death rate of wars:
◦# of deaths significantly reduced since Cold War
•Give us some hope that we are moving forward
•The cost of war (fatalities) - learning about cost of war hasn't been understood entirely
•30 years war - peak
•WWI peak
•WWII peak
•Peaks of which international system was not in equilibrium
◦Casualties due to death go down
◦On a current downwards movement
War is Puzzling:
•War is costly
•Blood and treasure
•States would rather get what they want without going to war
•"In war, the aggressor is always peace-loving; he would prefer to take over our country
unopposed." - Karl von Clausewitz
◦We couldn’t have gotten to where we are today without war.
◦Why didn't we anticipate how to get there without the cost of war
War understood as a means to get something else.
We fight a war in order to get something
We could be fighting a war over….
•Territory: any territory that I gain, is loss for you = 0 sum
◦Have to reach a bargaining agreement
•National Policies: N Korea threatening to launch nuclear attack on states
◦We want N Korea to give up policy
◦We try to find peaceful solution/deal
◦Have to use force to make you give up that policy
•Ex. Iran making nuclear weapons
•Regime Type: state want to change regime (security) to have power over other states
•Ethnic or Religious Divisions: rivalry that certain states or factions in states fight over
◦Fight over influence of region
◦80s: Iraq and Iran fighting over division of region
Graph: bargaining had to do with movement on the pareto frontier
•Cooperation and bargaining between Canada and the US
•0 sum game
◦Whatever I get, you lose
◦Whatever you get, I lose
War as a bargaining failure:
•Bargaining
◦One state threatens to use force in order to impose a deal or a bargain
•Crisis bargaining
•Coercive diplomacy
•"Do what I ask or else!"
Bargaining and the status quo:
•Reality of any war is always more complex than the model
•Try to simplify wars so that we can understand and make sense of them
If war were fought today, there would be a 50/ 50 distribution
If war weren't costly, then war would be inevitable
Good thing wars aren't costly
When states go at war: change status quo
Bigger the bargaining range, less likely war will happen
Smaller the bargaining range, greater the chance of war
The more costly wars are, the bargaining range will be enlarged, therefore they are less
likely to happen
And vise versa
A Model of war
Fertile farmland
Castle A -------l-----------------l----------- Castle B
Costs of fighting
Probable new border if A and B fight
Will be pieces of land that are economically useless IF war occurs
Watch monarch has reason to redraw farmland and find peaceful bargain
•With hopeful outcome of war WITHOUT the war
If they redraw boundaries peacefully, all the land would not be lost because no battle
fought
B would get a lot of land, A would get some
Both would be better off compared to the war outcome
For any A and B, if
•War is costly
•The object of contention is divisible
Then there is always at least one negotiated settlement that A and B will both prefer to
war
•Model predicts that war should NOT happen
•Even when these conditions are met, sometimes wars do happen
◦Threats to deter
◦Threats to compel
•Trying to redraw boarders or I will have to go to war with you
•Threat to compel other state into changing the boarder
•Threats can be meaningless or meaningful - to the extent that they are credible
Leads to two bargaining mistakes:
1.Yielding too little
2.Demanding too much
Why is info incomplete in International Politics?
•Incentives to misrepresent
•May seek to appear weaker or stronger
•May want to keep adversary guessing
If it falls outside bargaining range, wont give in, won't go to war
Want to show existing hegemon how much power you have over the years
How could war result from incomplete information?
A thinks certain outcome will happen
Thinks that B is going to accept it
What is A is going to misread what B will say
•Because I have a secret weapon that will destroy you and the last thing you want is to
start a war
•A thinks it's a lie because B wants A to stay put with status quo
◦Incentive to lie
◦A doesn't believe that there is secret weapon
◦A continues with threat and ultimatum
◦If you don't agree, then I will change boarder by force
•What if B was not bluffing and they did have a secret weapon?
◦A would go to war and will end up with B ending up further away
Threat put on table but states that they were bluffing - not bluffing and war happened
•Incomplete information about Hussain's power capabilities and resolve over the issue
Communicating resolve:
•Brinkmanship
•Tying hands
•Paying for power
◦Ways of minimizing incomplete information, making it more complete
Lecture 17 -War in international politics
Monday, October 30, 2017
1:46 PM
