CGSC 1001 Lecture Notes - Lecture 10: David Chalmers, Explanatory Gap, Capgras Delusion

• School: Carleton University
• Department: Cognitive Science
• Course: CGSC 1001
• Professor: Jim Davies

Document Summary

Recap: pretense and single code hypothesis: cognitive imaginings aren"t that diff from beliefs, both take propositions, both really closely related, only diff is beliefs will have some functional roles that imaginations won"t have. Seems to be uniquely human: driven by cognitive imagination, has nearly universal developmental trajectory. Pretense: how does it work: metarepresentational view (leslie, 1982): what is central to pretense is having the concept of pretend. Then we can apply this concept to certain behaviours and mental states and not others: behaviourist views (nicholes and stich): what is crentral to pretense is being able to behave as-if some scenario is true. A representation of a representation: application of pretend concept requires ability to represent a representation or behaviour as pretend, e. g. , sally"s belief that the banana is a phone. Pretense requires sally to represent that belief as a pretend belief: decoupler mechanism: the mechanism by which mental representations or behaviours are recognized as pretend or not.