LAW10010 Lecture Notes - Lecture 7: Statutory Interpretation, Amusement Arcade, Purposive Approach

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13 Jun 2018
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Topic 4: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Why might the meaning of legislation be unclear?
Poor drafting: many bills are hurried through parliament. Those drafting a bill may lack
specialist knowledge.
Inconsistencies & contradictions: parts of the same Act may conflict with each other. The
Act may conflict with other Acts. Acts are complex.
Wording and definitions: words may be poorly defined by the Act or may have multiple
meanings is common usage. The meaning of words may change over time.
Changing circumstances: Old laws may need to be reinterpreted to fit new developments
eg. technology
Object of statutory interpretation is to arrive at the presumed intention of the legislature.
Interpretation must be text based.
Where more than one construction of a law is available, there is no simple formula for
resolving the dispute. The process of interpretation is not the application of any rule but
involves a multifactorial assessment.
The context of the provision concerned (as well as the provision itself) is always to be
considered. If ascertainable, the legislative purpose must be taken into account. As a
result the relevant criteria will vary according to the problem at hand.
General principles of statutory interpretation
It is still necessary to know about the common law approaches because they have not
been superseded by the statutory provisions.
The precise relationship between common law and statutory principles is unclear.
The oo la itepetie tehiues a e desied as the liteal ad the
puposie appoahes to statuto itepetatio.
Common law approaches
Statutory interpretation
Words in a statute must be interpreted in the context in which they appear, according to their
plain and ordinary meaning.
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 161-2
(Higgins J):
> The fundamental rule of interpretation is that a statute is to be expounded
according to the intent of the Parliament that made it; and that intention has
to be found by an examination of the language used in the statute as a whole.
> The question is, what does the language mean; and when we find what the
language means, in its ordinary and natural sense, it is our duty to obey that
meaning, even if we think the result to be inconvenient or impolitic or
improbable.
Literal approach
An attractive simplicity, but has the defect that it assumes that a word or phrase in its textual
context always has only one meaning, which is not the case.
Original formulations left no room for other approaches, but now it is accepted that it
complements the purposive approach:
> Odiail, that eaig the legal eaig ill oespod ith the
grammatical meaning of the provision. But not always. The context of the
words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose
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of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a
legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the
liteal o gaatial eaig. [Project Blue sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting
Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ)]
Higgon v O’Dea [1962] WAR 140:
> The defendant who ran an amusement arcade was convicted of allowing a
minor on his premises in violation of a prohibition against allowing persons
ude 16 to eai i … a house, shop, o oo, o aplae of public
esot.
> The defendant had unsuccessfully argued that the provision should be read
down due to its absurd breadth (eg., house, shop or room).
> If an enactment is susceptible of two meanings, one rational and one absurd,
it is not merely permissible but it is proper for the court to adopt the rational
meaning.
> Where the language is clear and susceptible of only one meaning it is not
permissible for the court in effect to legislate by refusing to accept the plain
meaning of the words used by Parliament.
Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61: In construing statutes, and all written instruments, the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to
some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in
which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid
that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.
It is permissible to depart from the grammatical and ordinary meaning of words to
avoid an absurd result.
The golden rule has only occasionally needed to be used, it has been applied if a court
is persuaded that the document in question contains an error.
Footscray City Council v Ruzicka (2007) 16 VR 498: The golden rule is otherwise applied to
avoid construing legislation so as to produce patently unintended or absurd results.
Golden rule
Statutory interpretation
Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 61B(3) peiousl poided: If the
intestate leaves a husband or wife and also leaes issue, the if the alue of the estate does
not exceed the prescribed amount the whole estate shall be held in trust for the husband and
wife.
Problem if one of the spouses is dead, makes no sense to leave it in trust for both.
The ad ust e ead as o fo the poisio to opeate.
Origins of the mischief approach laid down in Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a which states
that the interpretation of all statutes in general requires consideration of four things:
> What was the common law before the making of the Act.
> What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
> What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the mischief.
> The true reason of the remedy; the office of all the Judges is always to make
such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy.
Purposive approach
It was generally accepted at common law that the purposive approach applied only when an
attempt to apply the literal approach produced an ambiguity or an inconsistency. [Mills v
Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214 per Dawson J]
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Document Summary

Topic 4: statutory interpretation: why might the meaning of legislation be unclear, poor drafting: many bills are hurried through parliament. Those drafting a bill may lack specialist knowledge. Inconsistencies & contradictions: parts of the same act may conflict with each other. Acts are complex: wording and definitions: words may be poorly defined by the act or may have multiple meanings is common usage. The meaning of words may change over time: changing circumstances: old laws may need to be reinterpreted to fit new developments eg. technology. Interpretation must be text based: object of statutory interpretation is to arrive at the presumed intention of the legislature, where more than one construction of a law is available, there is no simple formula for resolving the dispute. The process of interpretation is not the application of any rule but involves a multifactorial assessment: the context of the provision concerned (as well as the provision itself) is always to be considered.

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