Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right.
The payoffs are given in the following table
Player 2 Left Right Player 1Top 6 59 4 Bottom 7 45 3 where the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player B.
A) Does player 1 have a dominant strategy, and if so what is it?
B) Does player 2 have a dominant strategy and if so what is it?
C) For each of the following strategy combinations, write TRUE if it is a Nash Equilibrium, and FALSE if it is not:i) Top/Leftii) Top/Rightiii) Bottom/Leftiv) Bottom Right
D) What is Player 1âs maximin strategy?
E) What is player 2âs maximin strategy?
F) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method discussed in the class notes, what strategy will each player choose?
Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right.
The payoffs are given in the following table
Player 2 Left Right Player 1Top 6 59 4 Bottom 7 45 3 where the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player B.
A) Does player 1 have a dominant strategy, and if so what is it?
B) Does player 2 have a dominant strategy and if so what is it?
C) For each of the following strategy combinations, write TRUE if it is a Nash Equilibrium, and FALSE if it is not:i) Top/Leftii) Top/Rightiii) Bottom/Leftiv) Bottom Right
D) What is Player 1âs maximin strategy?
E) What is player 2âs maximin strategy?
F) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method discussed in the class notes, what strategy will each player choose?