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Economics
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2 Nov 2020

5. Political interest groups play their largest role in shaping legislation by

a. arguing before Federal appeals courts.

b. persuading voters through the mass media.

c. lobbying members of Congress.

d. directly petitioning the executive branch.

Booster class
Microeconomics
Skill
Understanding Special Interest Politics
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Raushan Raj
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2 Nov 2020

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Related questions

1) What is one of the reasons that interest groups have proliferated over the past half century?

a. Developments in technology made interest group activities easier.

b. A decline in government performance prompted new groups to form.

c. Interest groups became more successful in running candidates for office.

d. Legal restrictions on lobbying activities were lifted.

e. A decline in political parties led to more interest group formation.

2) Which of the following is an example of a single-issue interest group?

a. the Chamber of Commerce

b. the American Association of Retired Persons

c. the Virginia 21 Coalition

d. Common Cause

3) Which of the following is a cost of voting?

a. party identification

b. being informed

c. gender

d. political efficacy

4) Which of the following is an example of the free-rider (or collective action) problem?

a. an elected official accepting bribes from an interest group

b. an elected official relying on information from lobbyists

c. a political action committee contributing to candidates from both major political parties

d. an environmental group struggling to raise funds for a “clean air” campaign

5) Referring to Figure 10.2, which of the following statements about PAC campaign contributions made by banks and labor unions is true?

a.

Labor PACS donate slightly less money to campaigns overall than do banking PACs.

b.

Banking PACS direct their donations to support whichever candidate shares their ideological values.

c. Labor PACs consistently give the majority of their PAC money to Democrats, even when Republicans control Congress.

d. Banking PACS focus their money on Democrats, but when Republicans are in power, they split their donations between the two parties.

6) With the formation of so many interest groups in recent years and with so many of them having influence in Washington, __________ argue that it has been increasingly difficult to accomplish major policy change in Washington.

a.pluralists

b.hyperpluralists

c. elitists

d. labor unions

Public subsidies for new stadiums and arenas are commonly justified on the basis of economic benefits they will confer on the local economy rather than on public consumption externalities or on the value of an enhanced community image. Yet there is virtually no evidence of any perceptible economic development benefits from sports teams or stadiums. How, then, have sports leagues been so successful in persuading government officials and voters to subsidize their industry when they seem to promote the losing argument? Many referendums on using tax revenue to construct sports stadiums and arenas have been closed (Fort, 1997). At the end of the controversy, however, almost all cities have contributed public funds to subsidize private, for-profit teams owned by some of the wealthiest individuals in the world. The close votes suggest that stadium proponents-team owners and players-have been quite sophisticated in their appeals. If the votes had been overwhelmingly in favor of the subsidies, the proponents probably sought too little. If the voters had not generally approved the subsidies, they asked for too much. Part of the explanation for the success of subsidies for sports stadiums relies on the distribution of benefits and costs. Only a small proportion of people in any metropolitan area attend professional team sports contests. But those who do often are intensely interested. Thus substantial benefits accrue to some individuals, motivating them to become politically active in supporting the use of tax revenue to procure or retain a team. Team owners and players are also well organized and have low-cost access to the media in their effort to promote subsidization. In contrast, most voters do not find it in their interest to oppose actively a referendum that may cost them $25 or $50 per year in additional taxes. The issue is complex, the subsidies are indirect, and the proponents have almost all of the information. Those who are motivated to oppose the subsidies frequently are poorly funded, disorganized and politically naive. Misleading "economic impact statements" commissioned by the proponents of subsidization often confuse the public. As we have seen, these studies are fraught with methodological errors that may be easily overlooked for those not trained in economics. Given the close votes, the studies can be enormously effective even if they deceive only 2 or 3 percent of the voters

There are various ways to correct monopoly abuses, including government ownership, "public utility" type regulation, and injecting competition into the industry. Direct regulation has more appeal when there is a clear natural monopoly, which does not appear to be the case for professional sports. No one believes that two baseball teams in Chicago cause problems similar to those that would arise from duplicate water or electricity distribution systems. Direct regulation also risks the usual inefficiencies associated with political rather than economic motives, muting incentives for working, saving, investing and entrepreneurial activity. New entry would introduce competition to the monopoly sports leagues, but it is unlikely. Many have tried, but few have succeeded (Quirk and Fort, 1992, chs. 8-9). The successes came primarily in the 1960s and 1970s, after a long period during which franchise expansion in the major sports leagues failed to keep pace with population growth, and in the midst of rapidly increasing demand for sports entertainment fueled by the coming of sports interest age of the post-World War II baby boomers and the expansion of access to television. Those were days before astronomical broadcast rights contracts and stadium subsidies had driven players' salaries beyond the realm of normal incomes, and before the leagues realized that they could restrict the number of franchises so much as to attract an entirely new league. Today it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a new league to successfully enter any of the four major team sports, and individual teams cannot enter without the cooperation of incumbents because they would have no one to play. Unfortunately, the successful entrants three decades ago-the American Football League, the American Basketball Association and the World Hockey Association-all too quickly recognized their financial interest in joining rather than fighting the established leagues whose monopoly power they had challenged. In the case of football, in 1966 Congress even went so far as to pass special interest legislation that immunized the merger of the American and National Football Leagues from antitrust challenge. One possible road to remedy would be for the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Governors' Association to agree not to use publicly collected monies to finance the construction or maintenance of a sports facility for a privately-owned team (Rosentraub, 1997). While initiatives to this effect have been brought before these groups in the past, no action has ever been taken. The problem is that at any one point in time there are just a few cities or states affected by the demand for a new sports facility. Those mayors or governors not facing a threat are not inclined to alienate the professional leagues with whom they have or want a relationship. Moreover, the prospect of attracting a team with a subsidy may be too great a temptation for any one community to resist, and there is virtually no cost to a community for cheating on such a voluntary agreement. A variant of this scheme was proposed by U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who proposed a bill that would have prohibited the use of the federal tax exemption on municipal bonds for sports facilities where privately-owned teams would play. Like many similar efforts, Moynihan's bill died in committee. Divestiture may be the best remaining option. Each of the professional sports leagues is now approaching 30 teams. Dividing each sport into, say, four separate leagues could instill important elements of competition without destroying the value of a championship playoff. Competition could prevail in the market for players and, more importantly, in the market for team locations. Individual leagues might be exempted from antitrust prosecution for intra-league coordination, but coordination other than to arrange uniform playing rules and a championship playoff among the leagues would be prohibited. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) provides an example of such an organization of leagues. Although the NCAA is intimately involved in the regulation of the player labor market, it does not constrain either the size of college sports leagues or team locations. The various leagues participate jointly in many national championship competitions. Divestiture would solve many of the problems plaguing professional sports. The competitive imbalance problem would be ameliorated as teams with large revenue bases found their home territories invaded by entrants from smaller revenue bases in the other leagues. Such invasions would persist until revenue potential per team was approximately equal on the margin. Cities that could financially support new franchises would find entry into one of the leagues easier and (much) cheaper as the leagues competed to add viable new locations. Attractive places for sports teams (like Los Angeles for football or Washington, D.C., for baseball) would find interest from currently struggling franchises and probably would not have to provide a free stadium or arena to procure a team. Television networks could play the competitive leagues off against each other in bidding for broadcasting rights, which would likely fall precipitously. The most serious risk in a sports industry comprised of competing leagues is the possibility that one league will eventually be viewed as "better" than the others, and the weaker leagues will fail or be absorbed by the stronger leagues. Minimally, the legislation would be needed to permit periodic divestiture if this should occur. An alternative approach is to prohibit existing leagues from exercising collective control over team relocations. This approach would reduce the disparity in revenue potential because some teams from markets with lower revenue potential would invade the geographic territories of teams currently monopolizing the largest revenue potential markets. The result, for instance, could easily be more baseball teams in New York City and Los Angeles. Competitive team imbalance would decline because the revenue potential would equalize across teams as the geographic territories of current "haves" were invaded by current "have nots." Subsidies from cities to teams would shrink because leagues would be unable to prevent teams from competing to enter a city offering attractive market potential. Player salaries also would decline because both local television revenues and government subsidies would decline. Some cities would lose teams initially, but this would apply political pressure on the leagues to expand the number of franchises, thereby helping to attenuate the ultimate source of their market power. Franchise mobility may increase in the short run but should stabilize once a balance between demand for and supply of teams is established. Introducing competition into the market for franchise locations could be accomplished by either congressional or judicial action. Even with competitive leagues, existing teams would have some leverage in negotiating for publicly subsidized playing facilities because fans develop emotional ties to particular teams. The collection of such ties constitutes a sunk investment in a particular team for a community and can rationalize subsidies to retain a particular franchise that would not be sensible if the identity of the service provider were of no concern to fans. A common solution to such contracting problems (similar to those which arise between a coal mine and a single purpose railroad spur to the mine) is common ownership-that is, vertical integration. In the context of professional sports, vertical integration would constitute common ownership of the team and the emotional investment in it-in short, team ownership by the municipal government. Unfortunately, at the top level, none of the four major team sports leagues in the United States permit municipal ownership.9 This restriction is also subject to challenge under the Sherman Antitrust Act, but unless or until it is overturned, it is another way in which monopoly power stands in the way of economic efficiency in professional sports. Implementing either divestiture or a competitive market for team relocations would be a substantial challenge. Either reform would make team owners and players worse off. Both groups are well organized and have powerful incentives to maintain any monopoly power that enhances team revenues. Taxpayers, in contrast, would end up better off as a result of either reform. We believe that potential gains to the winners exceed the likely burden on the losers because the reforms, which rely on competitive prices to shape the allocation of resources between the private and public sectors and within the public sector itself, should improve efficiency. However, because the winners are a diffuse group of numerous individuals with but modest individual incentives to press for reform, the prospects for change are grim.

------------------------------------------------Question

According to the article by Siegfried and Zimbalist, what do they recommend as the most effective policy for reducing team bargaining power with state and municipal governments? That is, what policy do they suggest so that local governments will no longer have to subsidize new stadiums? Explain.

The largest percentage of money paid to the national union goes to:

a.

administration, operational, and salary expenses.
b.

retirement and strike fund.
c.

convention, publication, and retirement fund.
d.

political lobbying efforts.

Elements of a positive human resources management program include which of the following?

a.

absence of symbols of rank and status
b.

promotion from within
c.

competitive pay and benefits

d. all of these

The potential advantages of a merger of two unions, compared with the risks of not merging, suggest that mergers of unions will continue in the future.

True

False

The reason(s) local meetings is/are poorly attended include:

a.

meetings start late and last too long.
b.

material presented at meetings (reports of treasurer, project leaders, and committee chairs) is not interesting to the typical member.
c.

individuals frustrate the group by tying up meetings with personal grievances.

d. all of these

The local union meeting is considered the local union's most important governmental activity.

True

False

The local union meeting is considered the local union's most important governmental activity.

True

False

The AFL-CIO is very active in the political arena. However, which of the following are not actions of the AFL-CIO?

a.

publishes voting records of legislators at federal and state levels
b.

lobbies aggressively for favorable legislation
c.

attempts to influence presidential appointments

d. proclaims ties to a national political labor party

Representatives (number of delegates) for the AFI-CIO convention are chosen in the following manner:

a.

every union local gets only one vote.
b.

direct proportion to size of union local.
c.

in relation to size of the union local but not in direct proportion.

d. seniority within the union

Which of the following did not encourage union mergers?

a.

decline of some US industries
b.

executive preference
c.

avoidance of external controls
d.

jurisdictional disputes

The practice of double-breasting is legal under the National Labor Relations Act.

True

False

The term(s) used to describe the merging together of two or more unions is/are:

a.

affiliation.
b.

absorption.
c.

conglomeration.

d. affiliation, amalgamation, and absorption.

If a company desires to develop a program of positive human resources management, which of the following practices would the company utilize?

a

hiring specialized experienced supervisors from outside the company
b.

reserved parking spaces for managers
c.

have the human resources manager report directly to top management

Low attendance at union meetings should not be taken as the real measure of union participation because:

a.

low attendance may just indicate members are not concerned with any of the immediate issues facing the union.
b.

much membership participation takes place at an informal level.
c.

stewards regularly attend meetings and they maintain the link to the members they represent.
d.

all of these

Double-breasting is a practice employed by a company with a "union-avoidance" strategy.

True

False

A company's labor relations strategy is determined by:

a.

managerial philosophy.
b.

economic conditions.
c.

management ethics.
d.

all of these.

The craft unions and the industrial unions differ in a number of areas. Which of the following is not one of those areas?

a.

scope of the labor agreement
b.

attendance at and participation in meetings
c.

job characteristics

d.leadership roles

Most union presidents have restricted authority to appoint their staff, regulate locals, and direct the activities of the national union

True

False

Between conventions, the governing body of the AFL-CIO is the:

a.

General Board.
b.

Executive Council.
c.

standing committees.

d.state central bodies.

Participation in a typical local union meeting usually varies between:

a.

5 and 10 percent.
b.

0 and 5 percent.
c.

10 and 15 percent.

d. 15 and 20 percent.

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