Today the Internet is everywhere and publishers are working to disintermediate Marathon by selling directly to libraries. Marathon is still around, but they have lost market share. Libraries who have dropped Marathon are struggling with having to deal directly with the many different subscription policies of the e-journal publishers. Those libraries have begun to long for the simplicity of only having to deal with an aggregator like Marathon. The market is ripe for a new competitor to Marathon to emerge in this era of Cloud computing.

1. From the list of key topics, select the top three reasons that a new market entrant could emerge as a less expensive e-journal aggregator. This potential competitor to Marathon could solve the multiple subscription problems for libraries at better price than Marathon can offer due to their costs of running their legacy computing systems. Provide justification for each of your choices

a. There are challenges to established companies as they shift to cloud

b. There are enablers and barriers to new entrants in a market when they adopt a move to the cloud

c. Clouds lower barriers to entry, and lower capital costs to launch a business

d. Clouds shift spending from large capital costs to profits and innovation

e. IT Vendors are shifting from selling hardware and software to services

f. IT jobs are shifting from operations and maintenance to using business savvy technology and creating strategy in order to innovate

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Jean KeelingLv2

22 Aug 2018

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Hello, could I get some assistance summarizing this article for a discussion:

Read the articles and discuss the problems of Economic Inequality in the U.S.economy, summarize key points and post in the Discussions area:

Competition police crossing continents

Competition authorities are increasingly reaching beyond their country's borders

Feb 22^nd, 2014

WHEN TWO AMERICAN presidents, Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, embarked on a trustbusting mission a century ago, they were taking government into a new policy area: competition. Industrialization was still relatively new, and any monopolies that had emerged, such as the British and Dutch East India companies, had been created by governments.

The robber-baron companies of the late 19th century were accused of using their industrial muscle to drive competitors out of business. Private monopolies, the argument ran, diminished the benefits of capitalism; by definition, the existence of a monopoly made it impossible for a free market to operate.

Since then, governments have generally had some kind of competition policy, though not necessarily a coherent one. Politicians have tried to juggle several different priorities, among them putting the government in control of "strategic" industries (a category that has always included defense but often also a range of other industries, from airlines to car manufacturing, power generation, and telecoms); shielding domestic businesses from foreign ownership or competition, and protecting consumers from price-gouging.

In the past two decades, a new concern has emerged: that monopolies may be restricting innovation. The technology industry seems to have been particularly prone to creating near-monopolies, from Microsoft in software to Amazon in retailing and Google in an internet search. This is due to network effects. Consumers gravitate to the dominant technology, either because it offers more products or because many of their friends are already using the network concerned. These monopolists, it is feared, will be slow to introduce new technologies that might cannibalize their existing business; and they will be so entrenched that new competitors will find it hard to get a foothold.

Microsoft bundled its Internet Explorer browser with its dominant Windows operating software on personal computers. America's Department of Justice saw this as an attempt to force Netscape, a rival browser, out of the market. In a long court case that began in 1998, Microsoft was initially ordered to break itself in two. This ruling was overturned on appeal and a less onerous settlement was arrived at.

At the time many commentators felt that the authorities had overreached themselves. Internet Explorer was provided free of charge, so it was hard to see how consumers were being harmed. But this is a tricky area. On the one hand, rapid technological change can cause once-dominant companies to lose their position very quickly if they do not adapt; look at Nokia's and BlackBerry's mobile-phone businesses. Some argue that if the market is capable of such adjustment, governments should not get involved. The fact that some consumers make the wrong decision some of the time is not the basis for intervention, as long as all consumers are not being ripped off, says Simon Bishop of RBB Economics, a consultancy. On the other hand, such rapid change makes it hard to tell whether monopoly positions are being exploited, or whether a more competitive market would have produced more innovations.

Competition authorities have also had to rethink their role in cross-border deals. If one multinational takes over another, that might not create a monopoly in the country where the two groups have their headquarters, but it could do so in another country. A proposal for a merger between General Electric and Honeywell, announced in October 2000, was cleared by America's Department of Justice but blocked by the European Commission the following year. That objection appeared to herald a new era of transatlantic takeover disputes; in fact, it remains the only deal so far to have been cleared in America but blocked on the other side of the Atlantic.

However, there have been other instances of transatlantic disputes. In 2009 the European Commission imposed a 1.06 billion ($1.4 billion) fine on Intel, a chipmaker, after a complaint brought by an American rival, AMD. The ruling seemed to suggest that multinationals faced the prospect of double jeopardy because of inconsistent international rules.

We do it our way

There are some philosophical differences between Europe and America. Europe has a long tradition of state ownership of industry; even after privatization, many such companies retain dominant positions, at least in their national markets. In America, by contrast, market leaders have got there the hard way, by having superior technology or being more efficient. In Europe competition policy tends to be rules-based, with the European Commission issuing guidance for future mergers to follow; in America merger decisions tend to be hammered out in the courts, establishing legal precedent.

But multinationals also have to deal with competition policy in emerging markets. China is a particular challenge. The Chinese use competition policy to achieve other ends to keep out foreign firms or attack existing foreign businesses says, one expert. Latin American countries have tended to adopt the American model of competition policy, whereas eastern Europe has followed the example. Merger authorities from different countries have set up the International Competition Network to share the experience. Such efforts may reduce the double-jeopardy problems in international mergers, if only because rules may be applied more consistently.

In the longer term, the question is whether national competition policies will prove adaptable enough to cope with a globalized economy. It may make economic sense for global companies to exploit economies of scale and bring down prices for consumers, but national governments may be reluctant to accept the loss of control involved. In air travel, for example, fares have been reduced under pressure from low-cost airlines, but these newcomers are still being held back by policies that favor flagship carriers. If regulators in rich countries were to prove more zealous than their counterparts in emerging markets in restricting the size of multinationals, Western firms might be put at a competitive disadvantage.

New concerns for competition authorities are emerging all the time. Chris Walters, the acting chief economist of Britain's Office of Fair Trading (OFT), cites the practice of pay-for-delay, whereby a firm that holds a drug patent pays a generic manufacturer not to launch a rival drug to preserve the patent-holders monopoly profits. And David Currie, the chairman of the Competition and Markets Authority (which will take over from the OFT in April), recently pointed to a vast new potential problem, which he described as the growing collection, processing, and use of consumer-transaction data for commercial ends. This is proving an increasingly important source of competitive advantage; we need to be alert to the possibility that it will be an increasing source of consumer detriment.

aquamarinemoose208

Read the Thomas article, Squeeze Play, and discuss how long you think the emerging upstart airline carriers in Asia that are featured can continue their competitive role in the face of changing travel patterns and consumer behavior brought on by low cost carriers, the Internet and rising G.D.P.s

IT HARDLY IS NEWS THAT THE EMERGENCE IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION of multinational low-cost carriers modeled on the leading LCCs in North America and Europe has transformed and reinvigorated the inter-Asia travel market. But while most of the attention is focused on the impact these upstarts are having on major network/flag carriers, a less public battle is going on as Asia's niche airlines - SilkAir, Nok Air and Bangkok Airways, for example - find their space being challenged by the low-fare wave as well.

Neither full-service nor LCC, this band of carriers has fulfilled a role somewhat analogous to the holiday and charter airline segment in Europe, albeit on a much smaller scale. Some are standalone entities plying short-haul routes with turboprop and small jet aircraft. Others exist as part of a major airline organization, flying the last leg of a transcontinental journey into an Asia/Pacific vacation destination. The question is how long they can continue in their role in the face of changing travel patterns and consumer behavior brought on by LCCs, the Internet and rising GDPs.

A key year for them is 2015, when Southeast Asia's Open Sky Agreement comes into effect, allowing unlimited flights to all 10 ASEAN members: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Any protections they enjoy from restrictive bilaterals will disappear and they will be fully exposed to aggressive competition from today's batch of LCCs and future new entrants.

Perhaps Thailand presents the best microcosm of the wider challenges facing niche airlines. When Thai AirAsia was launched in 2004 with the political support of the government, Thai International Airways, itself government-owned, responded by establishing Nok Air, in which it holds a controlling 39% stake. But as so often happens in such situations (think British Airways and Go or Continental Airlines and CALite), Nok Air and its parent were more at war with each other than with the new entrant. While Thai AirAsia has come from nothing to operate a fleet of 19 new Airbus A320s serving 24 domestic and international destinations, Nok Air has just 10 aging Boeing 737-400s and two ATR 72s serving 17 domestic points.

The future for Nok may be a bit rosier. CEO Patee Sarasin told eTN in 2009 that the airline, which at the time was carrying fewer than 2 million passengers a year, had "buried the hatchet" with its owner and the two now had common goals. "It is true that we had difficulties in the past to cooperate as we lacked a common vision," he said. "We are now ready to cooperate again."
Prior to the makeup, Thai was considering selling its interest in Nok or assuming 100% control to make it a more effective competitor to Thai AirAsia, although in actuality a takeover might not have been possible owing to the refusal of other shareholders to sell. Part of the new agreement was a realignment of missions, with Nok shrinking its route network to only serve domestic destinations along with cooperation on schedules, distribution, marketing and loyalty programs.
The impact was immediate: Nok Air's 2010 passenger count was 3.1 million, with $128 million in revenue yielding a $20 million profit, according to data from the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation. Although these figures are well behind Thai AirAsia, which carried 5.7 million passengers, generating revenues of $402 million and a $92.4 million net profit, they are improved significantly from Nok's 2009 results. For 2011 it is forecasting a further lift of 22% in passengers to 3.8 million and a 47% jump in revenue to $175 million. Growth and fleet renewal are now front and center.
The airline, which operates from Bangkok's old Don Muang Airport, added four new destinations in April. Last year it took over three routes from Thai. Also on the agenda is expansion later this year of the secondary regional network with the addition of four ATR 72-500s leased from Nordic Aviation Capital. It is discussing the lease of seven 737-800s from 2012 as part of a conversion program to phase out its -400 Classics.
With Nok Air and Thai at peace and the former looking after domestic destinations, the parent did a deal last August with Tiger Airways to form Thai Tiger Airways to compete head-to-head with Thai AirAsia on international routes.
Supply Chain
Bangkok Airways' niche strategy is to control as much as possible of the journeys of high-yield tourists brought in via partnerships with Air France, Air Berlin, Etihad Airways and EVA Air. International tourists make up 80% of the airline's business, and while it has shelved plans for long-haul international operations, it is looking at Australia along with a return to Japan and China in the near term. Closer to home, flights to Malaysia are on the agenda for 2012.
BW, whose origin dates back to 1968, has nine A320s and eight ATR 72-500s serving eight domestic and eight regional international destinations. India has become a near-term focus after ASEAN's free trade area agreement with that country in 2010. Operations to Bangalore started in April and Chennai will follow in 2012. Services have been increased to daily to Mumbai, and New Delhi is on the radar.
nterestingly, the carrier has built three airports in Thailand - Samui, opened in 1989, Sukhothai (1996) and Trat (2002). Its hubs are Bangkok and the exotic resort of Koh Samui. A private airline, it carried 2.6 million passengers in 2010 and posted a profit of $23.3 million on revenues of $276.6 million. This year it expects a far more bullish outcome with passenger numbers up 19% to 3.1 million and revenues growing 28.2% to $352 million.
With some upbeat results under its belt, an IPO is on the radar. Late last year, President Puttipong Prasarttong-Osoth told the Bangkok Post that "next year should be an exceptionally good one for us barring any detrimental events such as renewed political turmoil. There's no set timeframe for an IPO, but we're thinking maybe in three years, as we must show continued profitability to meet set prerequisites."
Another Thai carrier, Orient Thai Airlines, which has had mixed fortunes over the years, ordered 12 98-seat Sukhoi Superjets last November, apparently on extremely favorable terms, to better position itself to compete with LCCs and carve out a stronger niche for itself. The small airline has been in the spotlight over alleged safety deficiencies yet has managed to stay aloft. In September 2007 an MD-82 of subsidiary One-Two-Go crashed at Phuket in a storm, killing 89. In July 2008 Orient Thai and its subsidiaries were suspended from flying for 30 days owing to an alleged poor maintenance record, while the EU banned One-Two-Go from flying to Europe (the ban later was lifted). Its 10-aircraft fleet is made up of MD-80s and MD-90s along with 747-300s and -400s that perform domestic services and one international route to Hong Kong plus mainly Hajj charters.
Delivery of the first two Superjets will occur in November with all 12 in service by 2014. They will both replace older types and enable expansion, although that will not involve One-Two-Go, which was shut down by the parent last year.
The flightpath for SilkAir, a wholly owned subsidiary of Singapore Airlines, is brighter, according to Peter Harbison, executive chairman of Sydney-based CAPA. "SilkAir is doing very well as a regional feeder for Singapore Airlines with a premium product," he says. It has 18 A320s and will receive three more this year and a further three by the end of 2013. It serves 31 of 50 short-haul destinations for SIA Group and its average sector length is just 955 km. While this may be short, it does stretch its legs to Chengdu, Chongqing and Kunming in central China as well as Xiamen and Shenzhen north of Hong Kong. India is also a big destination with services to six southern cities.
Harbison believes that SilkAir, which operates from the same terminals as its parent at Changi rather than the LCC terminal, plays a vital role for the overall network as SIA has no single-aisle equipment. It flies to holiday destinations such as Phuket, Penang and Langkawi but also largely has replaced SIA on services to Kuala Lumpur since AirAsia entered the route.
Less clear is whether the dividing line between SilkAir and LCC Tiger Airways, in which SIA Group holds a 34.4% stake, can be maintained. Whether or not SIA has kept the cat on a short leash - both sides deny it - the fact is that Tiger operates just 15 A320s out of Singapore and a further 11 in Australia, although it has 43 on order. Its JV with Thai Airways and its purchase of a 33% stake in Philippines-based SEAir suggests it may be ready to roar.
Back Where It Started
In the birthplace of Asia's LCC movement, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Airlines finally is reacting by turning its niche regional airline Firefly into an aggressive low-cost competitor to AirAsia. Firefly, which launched in 2007, operates seven ATR 72s and three 737s and is based at Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Airport in Subang just 30 min. from downtown Kuala Lumpur as well as having a series of secondary hubs such as Penang. Late last year it announced that it would acquire 30 737-800s over five years and concentrate more on services from Kuala Lumpur International to take on AirAsia. Nonetheless, it has used its downtown location well and operates flights to Singapore seven times daily with ATR 72s and to Penang 11 times daily. In all it serves 19 destinations in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore.
Is it possible that niche airlines in the region can find a peaceful coexistence with LCCs? Possibly, but the experience in North America, Australia and Europe suggests it will be difficult. Following deregulation, most US charter carriers folded as travelers and tour organizers found fares just as low on the major network airlines. Wardair, a popular Canadian charter carrier, tried to address the problem after Canadian deregulation by entering the scheduled market but could not make the transition. Australia's East West Airlines did not survive deregulation in the 1990s, caught as it was between Ansett and Australian/Qantas and without a clearly defined market.
The steady growth of US LCCs contributed greatly to the demise of Midwest Express (now part of Republic Airways Holdings' Frontier subsidiary). In Europe, the holiday/charter segment has taken its knocks from the likes of Ryanair and easyJet but continues to hold a large share of the market, although nothing like it enjoyed 20 years ago.
The answer, if one exists, is to identify a new market or find a fresh way to serve an existing one, as Allegiant Air has done in the US. With a route network focused on flying from smaller cites to major vacation destinations with very limited frequency and rock-bottom costs, Allegiant avoids the pitfalls of trying to compete head-on with either the network or LCC segment. Time will tell if such opportunities exist in Asia.