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28 Mar 2018

There are many examples of firms which were monopolies or near-monopolies but became a subject of antitrust actions or were affected by changing economics. Give one example. Explain how the firm lost certain market power. What lesson or lessons can managers learn from the example?

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Deanna HettingerLv2

31 Mar 2018

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1. To maximize profits, a firm should produce output up to the point where

A. marginal revenue equals marginal cost

B. price equals marginal cost

C. the gap between the demand curve and the ATC is the greatest

D. all of the above

E. answers a and b, but not c

2. Which statement is false?

A. a profit maximizing firm will increase production when price exceeds marginal cost

B. the lowest point on a firm's short-run supply curve is at the shut-down point

C. A firm will operate at that ouput where MC equals MR only when it is maximizing profits

D. A profit-maximizing firm will decrease production when marginal cost exceeds price.

3. which statement is true?

A. all monopolies are good

B. All monopolies are bad

C. Most natural monopolies are government regulated or government owned

D. None of these statements is true

4. There are _____ limits to monopoly power

A. no

B. some

C. many

5. Which statement is true?

A. the monopolist's most efficient output is her most profitable output as well

B. the monopolist charges a higher price than the perfect competitor in the long run.

C. all monopolists have control over an essential resource.

D. none is true

6. As a firm grows larger

A. economies of scale set in, then diseconomies of scale.

B. diseconomies of scale set in, then economies of scale.

C. economies of scale and diseconomies of scale set in at the same time.

D. neither economies of scale nor diseconomies of scale set in.

7. A monopolist operates at the minimum point of her ATC curve

A. only in the short run

B. only in the long run

C. in both the short run and the long run

D. in neither the short run nor the long run

8. A natural monopoly

A. has an average cost curve that reaches minimum possible average cost at a low level of output.

B. has a marginal cost curve that is steeply upward slopoing.

C. is usually subject to antitrust suits

D is usually allowed to choose its price so as to maximize profits in the United States.

E. occurs when a single firm can supply the entire market demand for a product at a lower average cost than would be possible if two or more firms supplied the market.

9. For a monopolist, the price of the product

A. always equals the marginal revenue

B. is always less than the marginal revenue

C. exceeds the marginal revenue

D. always equals the marginal cost of the product

10. Monopolies are usually viewed with concern from an economic standpoint since

A. size is ingerently dangerous; the larger ther firm, the more likely it is to squeeze out the "little producer"

B. resources may be allocated in an efficient manner.

C. the government may be put at the mercy of several large producers

D. always equals the marginal cost of the product

1) Assume that two firms (Firm A and Firm B) operate in the U.S. steel industry. The owner of Firm A writes the following letter to the owner of Firm B:

Dear Owner of Firm B,

I have concluded that if we both restrict output such that we each produce only 3 million tons of steel per year, we can both charge a price that will allow us to effectively monopolize the steel market and to maximize our joint profits. If you would like to enter into this agreement with me, please draft a contract that specifies this agreement and I will be more than willing to meet with you and sign it.

Sincerely,

Owner of Firm A

If this letter were sent in the year 1944, the:

a) Owners of both Firm A and Firm B would not be guilty of violating antitrust laws because antitrust laws in 1944 contained exceptions for certain nationally important industries like the steel industry.

b) Owners of both Firm A and Firm B would not be guilty of anything because there were no antitrust laws in existence in 1944.

c) Owner of Firm A would be guilty of violating antitrust laws only if she met with the owner of Firm B and signed the contract, but she would not be guilty if the attempt to monopolize the market failed because the owner of Firm B never responded to the letter.

d) Owner of Firm A would be guilty of violating antitrust laws because she merely attempted to monopolize the steel industry.

e) Owners of both Firm A and Firm B would not be guilty of violating antitrust laws because antitrust laws in 1944 applied only to industries made up of three or more firms.

2) Entry of new firms will continue in a monopolistically competitive industry until:

a) Marginal cost = 0 (zero).

b) Economic profit is negative.

c) Marginal revenue = marginal cost.

d) Economic profit equals zero.

e) Marginal Revenue = 0 (zero).

3) A monopolistically competitive firm usually charges less than a monopoly firm because:

a) It is part of a group of firms that have formally agreed to control the price and the output of a product.

b) Its primary goal is to reap monopoly profits by replacing competition with cooperation.

c) It has a monopoly, but potential entrants exist in the form of contestable markets.

d) It faces some degree of competition due to low barriers to entry.

e) Producing homogenous output is more expensive than producing differentiated output.

4) An example of price discrimination is when:

a) A single box of Froot Loops costs $3.50, but when purchased in a case of six, it costs only $3.00 per box.

b) You can purchase a new PC for half the price of a new Mac, even though they are both computers.

c) Procter & Gamble charges $9 for a bottle of Tide laundry detergent, while the store brand costs the consumer significantly less, despite being somewhat similar products.

d) Out-of-state students pay more for the same education as in-state students.

e)Movie theaters do not allow children into R-rated movies without a parent or guardian.

5) The Varsity, located in downtown Atlanta, is the world's largest drive-in restaurant. Located near the Georgia Tech campus, the drive-in attracts two distinct types of customers: college students and visitors to Atlanta. The owners are considering offering a student discount of $1 off their combo meal, which is regularly priced at $9. There are 5,000 students interested in purchasing a combo meal, with a maximum willingness to pay of $8. There are 5,000 visiting customers interested in purchasing the combo meal, with a maximum willingness to pay of $9. Assume that each customer, at most, will purchase a single meal and the marginal cost is $5. What will be the amount of total revenue for the Varsity if the owners offer a single price of $8 per combo meal?

a) $65,000

b) $85,000

c) $40,000

d) $80,000

e) $90,000

6) A competitive firm would have:

a) More elastic demand than a monopolistically competitive firm.

b) More inelastic demand than a monopolistically competitive firm.

c) A horizontal demand curve.

d) Bowed-in or bowed-out demand.

e) An upward-sloping demand curve.

7) It is unrealistic to regulate a natural monopoly at marginal cost pricing because:

a) The government is not allowed to regulate markets.

b) With this type of regulation, the firm will want to shut down, and that outcome is not desirable for society.

c) Firms do not need to follow regulations from the government.

d) Regulating a market causes more deadweight loss.

e) Marginal cost pricing ends up having the natural monopoly firm earn zero economic profits.

8) Price discrimination allows businesses to make additional profits and allows markets to work more:

a) Efficiently

b) Unfairly

c) Realistically

d) Equitably

e) Independently

9) Antitrust laws are designed to:

a) Increase prices.

b) Promote monopoly practices.

c) Promote awareness of government programs.

d) Promote competition.

e) Decrease output.

10) Barriers to entry:

a) Do not exist for monopolies.

b) Exist for perfectly competitive firms.

c) Restrict the entry of new firms into the market.

d) Always lead to profits.

e) Measure the ability of firms to set the price for a good.

ultramarinemule185

Hello, could I get some assistance summarizing this article for a discussion:

Read the articles and discuss the problems of Economic Inequality in the U.S.economy, summarize key points and post in the Discussions area:

Competition police crossing continents

Competition authorities are increasingly reaching beyond their country's borders

Feb 22^nd, 2014

WHEN TWO AMERICAN presidents, Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, embarked on a trustbusting mission a century ago, they were taking government into a new policy area: competition. Industrialization was still relatively new, and any monopolies that had emerged, such as the British and Dutch East India companies, had been created by governments.

The robber-baron companies of the late 19th century were accused of using their industrial muscle to drive competitors out of business. Private monopolies, the argument ran, diminished the benefits of capitalism; by definition, the existence of a monopoly made it impossible for a free market to operate.

Since then, governments have generally had some kind of competition policy, though not necessarily a coherent one. Politicians have tried to juggle several different priorities, among them putting the government in control of "strategic" industries (a category that has always included defense but often also a range of other industries, from airlines to car manufacturing, power generation, and telecoms); shielding domestic businesses from foreign ownership or competition, and protecting consumers from price-gouging.

In the past two decades, a new concern has emerged: that monopolies may be restricting innovation. The technology industry seems to have been particularly prone to creating near-monopolies, from Microsoft in software to Amazon in retailing and Google in an internet search. This is due to network effects. Consumers gravitate to the dominant technology, either because it offers more products or because many of their friends are already using the network concerned. These monopolists, it is feared, will be slow to introduce new technologies that might cannibalize their existing business; and they will be so entrenched that new competitors will find it hard to get a foothold.

Microsoft bundled its Internet Explorer browser with its dominant Windows operating software on personal computers. America's Department of Justice saw this as an attempt to force Netscape, a rival browser, out of the market. In a long court case that began in 1998, Microsoft was initially ordered to break itself in two. This ruling was overturned on appeal and a less onerous settlement was arrived at.

At the time many commentators felt that the authorities had overreached themselves. Internet Explorer was provided free of charge, so it was hard to see how consumers were being harmed. But this is a tricky area. On the one hand, rapid technological change can cause once-dominant companies to lose their position very quickly if they do not adapt; look at Nokia's and BlackBerry's mobile-phone businesses. Some argue that if the market is capable of such adjustment, governments should not get involved. The fact that some consumers make the wrong decision some of the time is not the basis for intervention, as long as all consumers are not being ripped off, says Simon Bishop of RBB Economics, a consultancy. On the other hand, such rapid change makes it hard to tell whether monopoly positions are being exploited, or whether a more competitive market would have produced more innovations.

Competition authorities have also had to rethink their role in cross-border deals. If one multinational takes over another, that might not create a monopoly in the country where the two groups have their headquarters, but it could do so in another country. A proposal for a merger between General Electric and Honeywell, announced in October 2000, was cleared by America's Department of Justice but blocked by the European Commission the following year. That objection appeared to herald a new era of transatlantic takeover disputes; in fact, it remains the only deal so far to have been cleared in America but blocked on the other side of the Atlantic.

However, there have been other instances of transatlantic disputes. In 2009 the European Commission imposed a 1.06 billion ($1.4 billion) fine on Intel, a chipmaker, after a complaint brought by an American rival, AMD. The ruling seemed to suggest that multinationals faced the prospect of double jeopardy because of inconsistent international rules.

We do it our way

There are some philosophical differences between Europe and America. Europe has a long tradition of state ownership of industry; even after privatization, many such companies retain dominant positions, at least in their national markets. In America, by contrast, market leaders have got there the hard way, by having superior technology or being more efficient. In Europe competition policy tends to be rules-based, with the European Commission issuing guidance for future mergers to follow; in America merger decisions tend to be hammered out in the courts, establishing legal precedent.

But multinationals also have to deal with competition policy in emerging markets. China is a particular challenge. The Chinese use competition policy to achieve other ends to keep out foreign firms or attack existing foreign businesses says, one expert. Latin American countries have tended to adopt the American model of competition policy, whereas eastern Europe has followed the example. Merger authorities from different countries have set up the International Competition Network to share the experience. Such efforts may reduce the double-jeopardy problems in international mergers, if only because rules may be applied more consistently.

In the longer term, the question is whether national competition policies will prove adaptable enough to cope with a globalized economy. It may make economic sense for global companies to exploit economies of scale and bring down prices for consumers, but national governments may be reluctant to accept the loss of control involved. In air travel, for example, fares have been reduced under pressure from low-cost airlines, but these newcomers are still being held back by policies that favor flagship carriers. If regulators in rich countries were to prove more zealous than their counterparts in emerging markets in restricting the size of multinationals, Western firms might be put at a competitive disadvantage.

New concerns for competition authorities are emerging all the time. Chris Walters, the acting chief economist of Britain's Office of Fair Trading (OFT), cites the practice of pay-for-delay, whereby a firm that holds a drug patent pays a generic manufacturer not to launch a rival drug to preserve the patent-holders monopoly profits. And David Currie, the chairman of the Competition and Markets Authority (which will take over from the OFT in April), recently pointed to a vast new potential problem, which he described as the growing collection, processing, and use of consumer-transaction data for commercial ends. This is proving an increasingly important source of competitive advantage; we need to be alert to the possibility that it will be an increasing source of consumer detriment.