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Explain the so-called “Balance-of-payments” (BoP) concept and how it relatesto the foreign-exchange (“forex”) market under: a) a floating-rate regime; andb) a so-called “pegged”-rate regime. Many developing countries, such as China,prefer a pegged rate – how does this limit their economic policy options,especially in dealing with problems such as inflation?

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Insha Fatima
Insha FatimaLv10
28 Sep 2019

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Related questions

Question 1 What factors determine the demand for British pounds in foreign exchange markets? How are exchange rates determined under a flexible exchange rate system?

Question 2 Why can't all the balance of payments accounts be in surplus?

Question 3 How can tariffs protect U.S. jobs? Do tariffs lead to a net increase in jobs? Explain. Who are the winners and losers from trade restrictions? Given that trade restrictions impose losses on an economy, why are trade restrictions so common?

Question 4 Describe developing countries and how they differ from industrial market economies. How can international trade aid development? In what ways does the international economy impose problems on developing countries?

Question 5 How can two countries both be better off as a result of trade?

Too Late to Compensate Free Trade’s Losers

CAMBRIDGE – It appears that a new consensus has taken hold these days among the world’s business and policy elites about how to address the anti­globalization backlash that populists such as Donald Trump have so ably exploited. Gone are the confident assertions that globalization benefits everyone: we must, the elites now concede, accept that globalization produces both winners and losers. But the correct response is not to halt or reverse globalization; it is to ensure that the losers are compensated.

The new consensus is stated succinctly by Nouriel Roubini: the backlash against globalization “can be contained and managed through policies that compensate workers for its collateral damage and costs,” he argues. “Only by enacting such policies will globalization’s losers begin to think that they may eventually join the ranks of its winners.”

This argument seems to make eminent sense, both economically and politically. Economists have long known that trade liberalization causes income redistribution

and absolute losses for some groups, even as it enlarges a country’s overall economic pie. Therefore, trade deals unambiguously enhance national wellbeing only to the extent that winners compensate losers. Compensation also ensures support for trade openness from broader constituencies and should be good politics.

Prior to the welfare state, the tension between openness and redistribution was resolved either by large­scale emigration of workers or by re­imposing trade protection, especially in agriculture. With the rise of the welfare state, the constraint became less binding, allowing for more trade liberalization. Today the advanced countries that are the most exposed to the international economy are also those where safety nets and social insurance programs – welfare states – are the most extensive. Research in Europe has shown that losers from globalization within countries tend to favor more active social programs and labor­market interventions.

If opposition to trade has not become politically salient in Europe today, it is partly because such social protections remain strong there, despite having weakened in recent years. It is not an exaggeration to say that the welfare state and the open economy have been flip sides of the same coin during much of the twentieth century.

Compared to most European countries, the United States was a latecomer to globalization. Until recently, its large domestic market and relative geographical insulation provided considerable protection from imports, especially from low­wage countries. It also traditionally had a weak welfare state.

When the US began opening itself up to imports from Mexico, China, and other developing countries in the 1980s, one might have expected it to go the European route. Instead, under the sway of Reaganite and market­fundamentalist ideas, the US went in an opposite direction. As Larry Mishel, president of the Economic Policy Institute, puts it, “ignoring the losers was deliberate.” In 1981, the “trade adjustment assistance (TAA) program was one of the first things Reagan attacked, cutting its weekly compensation payments.”

The damage continued under subsequent, Democratic administrations. In Mishel’s words, “if free­traders had actually cared about the working class, they could have supported a full range of policies to support robust wage growth: full employment,

collective bargaining, high labor standards, a robust minimum wage, and so on.” And all of this could have been done “before administering ‘shocks’ by expanding trade with low­wage countries.”

Could the US now reverse course, and follow the newly emergent conventional wisdom? Back in 2007, political scientist Ken Scheve and economist Matt Slaughter called for “a New Deal for globalization” in the US, one that would link “engagement with the world economy to a substantial redistribution of income.” In the US, they argued, this would mean adopting a much more progressive federal tax system.

Slaughter had served in a Republican administration, under President George W. Bush. It is an indication of how polarized the US political climate has become that it is impossible to imagine similar proposals coming out of Republican circles these days. The effort by Trump and his Congressional allies to emasculate former President Barack Obama’s signature health­insurance program reflected Republicans’ commitment to scaling back, not expanding, social protections.

Today’s consensus concerning the need to compensate globalization’s losers presumes that the winners are motivated by enlightened self­interest – that they believe buy­in from the losers is essential to maintain economic openness. Trump’s presidency has revealed an alternative perspective: globalization, at least as currently construed, tilts the balance of political power toward those with the skills and assets to benefit from openness, undermining whatever organized influence the losers might have had in the first place. Inchoate discontent about globalization, Trump has shown, can easily be channeled to serve an altogether different agenda, more in line with elites’ interests.

The politics of compensation is always subject to a problem that economists call “time inconsistency.” Before a new policy – say, a trade agreement – is adopted, beneficiaries have an incentive to promise compensation. Once the policy is in place, they have little interest in following through, either because reversal is costly all around or because the underlying balance of power shifts toward them.

The time for compensation has come and gone. Even if compensation was a viable approach two decades ago, it no longer serves as a practical response to

globalization’s adverse effects. To bring the losers along, we will need to consider changing the rules of globalization itself.

QUESTIONS:

a. According to Rodrik, why is it that "trade deals unambiguously enhance national wellbeing only to the extend that winners compensate losers?" Explain completely.

b. Rodrik draws a historical link between globalization and the "welfare state." Explain this link.

c. Rodrik mentions a previous proposal by Scheve and Slaughter called "A New Deal for Globalization." What was the essence of this proposal? What has become of it?

d. What is the "time inconsistency" problem and why is it relevant for Rodrik's argument?

e. In your opinion, what is one weakness in Rodrik's argument? Explain.

Topic:
How would you explain the finding that people in high-income economies seem happier than people in low-income economies, but, over time, people in high-income economies do not seem to be any happier even if their country grows richer? Briefly discuss.

Optional Reading:

Income and Happiness

The Declaration of Independence in 1776 identified “certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” This did not guarantee happiness but did establish the pursuit of happiness as an “unalienable” right, meaning that right cannot be taken away, given away, or sold. Eighteenth century philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham argued that government policy should promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.

Many people today apparently agree. In recent polls, 77 percent of Australians and 81 percent of Brits believed that a government's prime objective should be promoting the greatest happiness rather than the greatest wealth. The United Nations in 2007 sponsored an international conference on “Happiness and Public Policy.” Thailand now compiles a monthly Gross Domestic Happiness Index. Even China has joined in the fun reporting a happiness index based on polling results about living conditions, income, the environment, social welfare, and employment. Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom are also developing happiness indexes.

Economists have long shied away from asking people how they feel, preferring instead to observe their behavior. But more now see some value in asking questions. In the most extensive of polls, the Gallup organization asked people in 130 countries: “How satisfied are you with your life, on a scale of zero to ten?” The results, reported in 2007, are not surprising. Most people in the high income areas, such as the United States, Europe, and Japan, said they are happy. Most people in the poor areas, especially in Africa, said they are not. Also, within a given country, income and happiness are positively related. After evaluating all the results of the Gallup world poll, Angus Deaton of Princeton concluded: “The very strong international relationship between per capita GDP and life satisfaction suggests that, on average, people have a good idea of how income, or the lack of it, affects their lives.” 8

So these results are no surprise. What does puzzle economists is that other surveys suggest that in affluent countries people do not seem any happier over time even though each generation became richer than the last. For example, in the United States, the proportion of people who say they are happy has stayed about the same despite 60 years of economic growth. In Japan, happiness responses actually declined despite a substantial increase in real income over the last 50 years.

Here are two possible explanations. First, people begin taking for granted those luxuries they most desired. For example, two generations ago color TVs, automobiles, and major appliances were luxuries, but now they are must-items for most households. Computers and flat screen HDTVs will soon move from luxuries to necessities. As each generation attains a higher standard of living, people become less sensitive to the benefits, they take them for granted, and thus they say they are no happier.

Second, research suggests that what matters is not just the absolute level of income but income relative other people in the reference group. Imagine you have a choice between (1) earning $50,000 a year while others in your reference group make $25,000 or (2) earning $100,000 a year while others make $250,000 (suppose, too, that prices remain the same, so $100,000 is double the real income of $50,000). Which would you prefer? Studies show that when people face this hypothetical choice, most pick the $50,000 option. That is, they prefer to make more than others even if that means a lower real income. Thus, if all incomes rise on average over time, this does not affect that aspect of happiness linked to one’s relative standing. As the social critic H. L. Mencken long ago observed, "A wealthy man is one who earns $100 a year more than his wife's sister's husband."

SOURCES: Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling On Happiness, (New York: Knopf, 2006); Marina Kamenev, “Rating Countries for the Happiness Factor,” Business Week, 11 October 2006; Angus Deaton, “Income, Aging, Health, and Wellbeing Around the World: Evidence from the Gallup World Poll,” Princeton Working Paper, (August 2007); and “Where Money Seems to Talk,” Economist, 12 July 200

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