Little Kona is a small coffee company that is considering entering a market dominated by Big Brew. Each company's profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price:
Big Brew
High Price
Low Price
Little Kona
Enter
$2 million, $3 million
-$2 million, $1 million
Don't Enter
$0, $8 million
$0, $3 million
True or False: Both Little Kona and Big Brew have a dominant strategy in this game.
Which of the following outcomes represents a Nash equilibrium in this case? Check all that apply.
Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters.
Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter.
Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters.
Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter.
Big Brew threatens Little Kona by saying, 'If you enter, we're going to set a low price, so you had better stay out.'
True or False: Little Kona should not believe the threat.
If the two firms could collude and agree on how to split the total profits, what outcome would they pick?
Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters.
Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter.
Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters.
Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter.
Little Kona is a small coffee company that is considering entering a market dominated by Big Brew. Each company's profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price:
Big Brew | |||
High Price | Low Price | ||
Little Kona | Enter | $2 million, $3 million | -$2 million, $1 million |
Don't Enter | $0, $8 million | $0, $3 million |
True or False: Both Little Kona and Big Brew have a dominant strategy in this game.
Which of the following outcomes represents a Nash equilibrium in this case? Check all that apply.
Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters.
Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter.
Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters.
Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter.
Big Brew threatens Little Kona by saying, 'If you enter, we're going to set a low price, so you had better stay out.'
True or False: Little Kona should not believe the threat.
If the two firms could collude and agree on how to split the total profits, what outcome would they pick?
Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters.
Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter.
Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters.
Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter.