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HUMA 1780 Lecture Notes - Lecture 11: Jonathan Harker

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lemondolphin719
23 Jan 2018
School
York University
Department
Humanities
Course
HUMA 1780
Professor
Carol Bigwood

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Document Summary

Yaffa segal 215751639 huma 1780 november 27, 2017. First person point-of-view is very different than second or third point-of-view. First person point-of-view seems to be more realistic because we experience real life through one perspective, our own. In addition, it also allows for a deeper connection to the character who"s point-of-view it is, because the reader usually has the opportunity to know all the thoughts, feelings, and emotions of the character. However, the reader is also limited to what the character knows, unless the author is switching point-of-views, which can be confusing for the reader. In addition, the character must be interesting and relatable to readers. Second person point-of-view is probably the rarest point-of-view seen in novels because it addresses the reader as you" or reader". The advantage of second person point-of-view is that the reader often feels a deeper connection and involvement with the story. The reader is a participant in the story as opposed to just reading it.

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Related Questions

What exactly was Hooker's response to Darwin's, Origin of Species? Thank you for your help. I need help deciphering what his opinions truly were.

Hooker, J. D. 1859. [Review of] On the origin of species. Gardeners' Chronicle (31 December): 1052. Part 1.

From the above expressions it will be inferred that we have risen from the perusal of Mr. DARWIN'S book much impressed with its importance, and have moreover found it to be so dependent on the phenomena of horticultural operations, for its facts and results, and so full of experiments that may be repeated and discussed by intelligent gardeners, and of ideas that may sooner fructify in their minds than in those of any other class of naturalists, that we shall be doing them (and we hope also science) a service by dwelling in some detail upon its contents. Thus much we may premise, that it is a book teeming with deep thoughts on numberless simple and complex phenomena of life; that its premises in almost all cases appear to be correct; that its reasoning is apparently close and sound, its style clear, and we need hardly add its subject and manner equally attractive and agreeable; it is also a perfectly ingenuous book, bold in expressions as in thought where the author adduces what he considers clear evidence in his favour, frank in the statement of objections to the hypotheses or conclusions founded on its facts and reasonings; and uniformly courteous to antagonistic doctrines. In fine, whatever may be thought of Mr. DARWIN'S ultimate conclusions, it cannot be denied that it would be difficult in the whole range of the literature of science to find a book so exclusively devoted to the development of theoretical inquiries, which at the same time is throughout so full of conscientious care, so fair in argument, and so considerate in tone. . . . Hitherto most [naturalists] have, as we have already observed, contented themselves with the hypothesis that they were independently created, and the minority have clung to the only other explanation hitherto conceived, that they have all been created by variation from a single first-created living organism, or a few such. Now it must be borne in mind that both these views are mere hypotheses in a scientific point of view; neither has any inherent or prescriptive right to a preference in the mind of the impartial inquirer; but the most superficial observation will show that the hypothesis of original creations is incapable of absolute proof, except the operation be witnessed by credible naturalists, and can only be supported by facts that are either not conclusive against the opposite doctrine, or may be regarded as equally favourable to it; and this hypothesis is hence placed at a disadvantage in comparison with that of the creation of species by variation, which takes its stand on the familiar fact that species do depart from the likeness of their progenitors, both in a wild and domestic state. On the other hand the hypothesis of creation by variation labours under the disadvantage of being founded upon a series of phenomena, the action of each of which individually, as explained by Mr. DARWIN, would appear to prevent the possibility of species retaining their characters for any length of time, and it therefore appears at first sight opposed to the undisputed fact, that many hundreds of animals and plants have transmitted their characters unchanged (or nearly so) through countless generations, and covered, even within the historic period, many square miles of country each with millions of its exact counterpart. To explain this anomaly and to raise this hypothesis of creations by variation to the rank of a scientific theory, is the object of Mr. DARWIN'S book, and to do this he has endeavoured to invent and prove such an intelligible rationale of the operation of variation, as will account for many species having been developed from a few in strict adaptation to existing conditions, and to show good cause how these apparently fleeting changelings may by the operation of natural laws be so far fixed as to reconcile both the naturalist and the common observer to the idea, that what in all his experience are immutable forms of life may have once worn another guise. The hypothesis itself is a very old one; it was, as all the world knows, strongly advocated by LAMARCK, and later still by the author of the "Vestiges of the Natural History of the Creation," but neither of these authors were able to suggest even a plausible method according to which Nature might have proceeded in producing suitable varieties, getting rid of intermediate forms, and giving a temporary stability to such as are recognised as species by all observers. Mr. DARWIN has been more successful, though whether completely so or not the future alone can show. We shall proceed to examine his method in another article.

Short Story
“The Bet” (or how your money finds its way to Wall Street)

Long Bets was seeded by Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and operates as a non-profit organization that administers just what you’d guess: long-term bets. To participate, “proposers” post a proposition at Longbets.org that will be proved right or wrong at a distant date. They then wait for a contrary-minded party to take the other side of the bet. When a “doubter” steps forward, each side names a charity that will be the beneficiary if its side wins; parks its wager with Long Bets; and posts a short essay defending its position on the Long Bets website. When the bet is concluded, Long Bets pays off the winning charity.

Here are examples of what you will find on Long Bets’ very interesting site:

In 2002, entrepreneur Mitch Kapor asserted that “By 2029 no computer – or ‘machine intelligence’ – will have passed the Turing Test,” which deals with whether a computer can successfully impersonate a human being. Inventor Ray Kurzweil took the opposing view. Each backed up his opinion with $10,000. I don’t know who will win this bet, but I will confidently wager that no computer will ever replicate Charlie.

That same year, Craig Mundie of Microsoft asserted that pilotless planes would routinely fly passengers by 2030, while Eric Schmidt of Google argued otherwise. The stakes were $1,000 each. To ease any heartburn Eric might be experiencing from his outsized exposure, I recently offered to take a piece of his action. He promptly laid off $500 with me. (I like his assumption that I’ll be around in 2030 to contribute my payment, should we lose.)

Now, to my bet and its history. In Berkshire’s 2005 annual report, I argued that active investment management by professionals – in aggregate – would over a period of years underperform the returns achieved by rank amateurs who simply sat still. I explained that the massive fees levied by a variety of “helpers” would leave their clients – again in aggregate – worse off than if the amateurs simply invested in an unmanaged low-cost index fund.

Subsequently, I publicly offered to wager $500,000 that no investment pro could select a set of at least five hedge funds – wildly-popular and high-fee investing vehicles – that would over an extended period match the performance of an unmanaged S&P-500 index fund charging only token fees. I suggested a ten-year bet and named a low-cost Vanguard S&P fund as my contender. I then sat back and waited expectantly for a parade of fund managers – who could include their own fund as one of the five – to come forth and defend their occupation. After all, these managers urged others to bet billions on their abilities. Why should they fear putting a little of their own money on the line?

If Group A (active investors) and Group B (do-nothing investors) comprise the total investing universe, and B is destined to achieve average results before costs, so, too, must A. Whichever group has the lower costs will win. (The academic in me requires me to mention that there is a very minor point – not worth detailing – that slightly modifies this formulation.) And if Group A has exorbitant costs, its shortfall will be substantial. There are, of course, some skilled individuals who are highly likely to out-perform the S&P over long stretches.

In my lifetime, though, I’ve identified – early on – only ten or so professionals that I expected would accomplish this feat. There are no doubt many hundreds of people – perhaps thousands – whom I have never met and whose abilities would equal those of the people I’ve identified. The job, after all, is not impossible. The problem simply is that the great majority of managers who attempt to over-perform will fail. The probability is also very high that the person soliciting your funds will not be the exception who does well. Bill Ruane – a truly wonderful human being and a man whom I identified 60 years ago as almost certain to deliver superior investment returns over the long haul – said it well: “In investment management, the progression is from the innovators to the imitators to the swarming incompetents.”

Further complicating the search for the rare high-fee manager who is worth his or her pay is the fact that some investment professionals, just as some amateurs, will be lucky over short periods. If 1,000 managers make a market prediction at the beginning of a year, it’s very likely that the calls of at least one will be correct for nine consecutive years. Of course, 1,000 monkeys would be just as likely to produce a seemingly all-wise prophet.

But there would remain a difference: The lucky monkey would not find people standing in line to invest with him. Finally, there are three connected realities that cause investing success to breed failure. First, a good record quickly attracts a torrent of money. Second, huge sums invariably act as an anchor on investment performance: What is easy with millions, struggles with billions (sob!). Third, most managers will nevertheless seek new money because of their personal equation – namely, the more funds they have under management, the more their fees. These three points are hardly new ground for me: In January 1966, when I was managing $44 million, I wrote my limited partners: “I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results. Therefore, I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL. I have notified Susie that if we have any more children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for them.”

The bottom line: When trillions of dollars are managed by Wall Streeters charging high fees, it will usually be the managers who reap outsized profits, not the clients. Both large and small investors should stick with low-cost index funds.

In many aspects of life, indeed, wealth does command top-grade products or services. For that reason, the financial “elites” – wealthy individuals, pension funds, college endowments and the like – have great trouble meekly signing up for a financial product or service that is available as well to people investing only a few thousand dollars. This reluctance of the rich normally prevails even though the product at issue is –on an expectancy basis – clearly the best choice. My calculation, admittedly very rough, is that the search by the elite for superior investment advice has caused it, in aggregate, to waste more than $100 billion over the past decade. Figure it out: Even a 1% fee on a few trillion dollars adds up. Of course, not every investor who put money in hedge funds ten years ago lagged S&P returns. But I believe my calculation of the aggregate shortfall is conservative.

Much of the financial damage befell pension funds for public employees. Many of these funds are woefully underfunded, in part because they have suffered a double whammy: poor investment performance accompanied by huge fees. The resulting shortfalls in their assets will for decades have to be made up by local taxpayers.

Human behavior won’t change. Wealthy individuals, pension funds, endowments and the like will continue to feel they deserve something “extra” in investment advice. Those advisors who cleverly play to this expectation will get very rich. This year the magic potion may be hedge funds, next year something else. The likely result from this parade of promises is predicted in an adage: “When a person with money meets a person with experience, the one with experience ends up with the money and the one with money leaves with experience.”

Question:
Summarize Buffett’s views on “The Bet” and passive investment management