PHL100Y1 Lecture Notes - Lecture 4: Free Rider Problem
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What does this presuppose: that distribution of labour will work out. That may require some state-run coercion or at least education: prior agreement to keep agreements. This does(cid:374)"t take (cid:272)are of the free rider problem. Motivation problem: collaboration is easy when everyone benefits in proportion to their efforts, morality means cooperating even when i lose, the free rider problem arises (cid:449)he(cid:374) (cid:373)(cid:455) (cid:272)o(cid:374)tri(cid:271)utio(cid:374) does(cid:374)"t (cid:373)ake (cid:373)u(cid:272)h differe(cid:374)(cid:272)e. If e(cid:448)er(cid:455)o(cid:374)e else (cid:272)lea(cid:374)s up, i do(cid:374)"t (cid:374)eed to. If (cid:374)o o(cid:374)e else (cid:272)lea(cid:374)s up, (cid:449)hat i do (cid:449)o(cid:374)"t (cid:373)atter. Common examples are many (e. g. the overpopulation problem: overcoming poverty means less population growth. If one child were voluntary, each would think: Either others will confor(cid:373) or the(cid:455) (cid:449)o(cid:374)"t. If the(cid:455) do, (cid:373)(cid:455) old age (cid:449)ill (cid:271)e (cid:271)etter if i ha(cid:448)e (cid:1005)(cid:1004) (cid:272)hildre(cid:374) (cid:894)a(cid:374)d it (cid:449)o(cid:374)"t (cid:373)ake (cid:373)u(cid:272)h difference to others) If the(cid:455) do(cid:374)"t, i"ll reall(cid:455) (cid:374)eed (cid:1005)(cid:1004) (cid:272)hildre(cid:374) So, either way i"(cid:373) (cid:271)etter off havi(cid:374)g (cid:1005)(cid:1004) (cid:272)hildre(cid:374)
