KNPE 153 Lecture Notes - Lecture 9: Net Force, Dynamic Equilibrium, Linear Stability

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ultramarinemole832

2 Dec 2016

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Being stable can mean a variety of things . Not easily moved around or thrown off balance; firm, steady. Mechanically, stability is thus the capacity of an object to return to equilibrium or to its original position after it has been displaced. In the world of sports ad human movement activities, many athletes do not want to be moved from a particular stance or position they want to be in a very stable position. When they want to be in a very stable position (where they are more successful if their stance is more stable): When they want to be able to move quickly out of a position (where they are more successful is their stance is less stable): A sprinter coming out of the blocks. The stability of an object is affected by: The height of the center of gravity. P = toppling force h = moment arm of the toppling force.

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Public subsidies for new stadiums and arenas are commonly justified on the basis of economic benefits they will confer on the local economy rather than on public consumption externalities or on the value of an enhanced community image. Yet there is virtually no evidence of any perceptible economic development benefits from sports teams or stadiums. How, then, have sports leagues been so successful in persuading government officials and voters to subsidize their industry when they seem to promote the losing argument? Many referendums on using tax revenue to construct sports stadiums and arenas have been closed (Fort, 1997). At the end of the controversy, however, almost all cities have contributed public funds to subsidize private, for-profit teams owned by some of the wealthiest individuals in the world. The close votes suggest that stadium proponents-team owners and players-have been quite sophisticated in their appeals. If the votes had been overwhelmingly in favor of the subsidies, the proponents probably sought too little. If the voters had not generally approved the subsidies, they asked for too much. Part of the explanation for the success of subsidies for sports stadiums relies on the distribution of benefits and costs. Only a small proportion of people in any metropolitan area attend professional team sports contests. But those who do often are intensely interested. Thus substantial benefits accrue to some individuals, motivating them to become politically active in supporting the use of tax revenue to procure or retain a team. Team owners and players are also well organized and have low-cost access to the media in their effort to promote subsidization. In contrast, most voters do not find it in their interest to oppose actively a referendum that may cost them $25 or $50 per year in additional taxes. The issue is complex, the subsidies are indirect, and the proponents have almost all of the information. Those who are motivated to oppose the subsidies frequently are poorly funded, disorganized and politically naive. Misleading "economic impact statements" commissioned by the proponents of subsidization often confuse the public. As we have seen, these studies are fraught with methodological errors that may be easily overlooked for those not trained in economics. Given the close votes, the studies can be enormously effective even if they deceive only 2 or 3 percent of the voters

There are various ways to correct monopoly abuses, including government ownership, "public utility" type regulation, and injecting competition into the industry. Direct regulation has more appeal when there is a clear natural monopoly, which does not appear to be the case for professional sports. No one believes that two baseball teams in Chicago cause problems similar to those that would arise from duplicate water or electricity distribution systems. Direct regulation also risks the usual inefficiencies associated with political rather than economic motives, muting incentives for working, saving, investing and entrepreneurial activity. New entry would introduce competition to the monopoly sports leagues, but it is unlikely. Many have tried, but few have succeeded (Quirk and Fort, 1992, chs. 8-9). The successes came primarily in the 1960s and 1970s, after a long period during which franchise expansion in the major sports leagues failed to keep pace with population growth, and in the midst of rapidly increasing demand for sports entertainment fueled by the coming of sports interest age of the post-World War II baby boomers and the expansion of access to television. Those were days before astronomical broadcast rights contracts and stadium subsidies had driven players' salaries beyond the realm of normal incomes, and before the leagues realized that they could restrict the number of franchises so much as to attract an entirely new league. Today it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a new league to successfully enter any of the four major team sports, and individual teams cannot enter without the cooperation of incumbents because they would have no one to play. Unfortunately, the successful entrants three decades ago-the American Football League, the American Basketball Association and the World Hockey Association-all too quickly recognized their financial interest in joining rather than fighting the established leagues whose monopoly power they had challenged. In the case of football, in 1966 Congress even went so far as to pass special interest legislation that immunized the merger of the American and National Football Leagues from antitrust challenge. One possible road to remedy would be for the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Governors' Association to agree not to use publicly collected monies to finance the construction or maintenance of a sports facility for a privately-owned team (Rosentraub, 1997). While initiatives to this effect have been brought before these groups in the past, no action has ever been taken. The problem is that at any one point in time there are just a few cities or states affected by the demand for a new sports facility. Those mayors or governors not facing a threat are not inclined to alienate the professional leagues with whom they have or want a relationship. Moreover, the prospect of attracting a team with a subsidy may be too great a temptation for any one community to resist, and there is virtually no cost to a community for cheating on such a voluntary agreement. A variant of this scheme was proposed by U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who proposed a bill that would have prohibited the use of the federal tax exemption on municipal bonds for sports facilities where privately-owned teams would play. Like many similar efforts, Moynihan's bill died in committee. Divestiture may be the best remaining option. Each of the professional sports leagues is now approaching 30 teams. Dividing each sport into, say, four separate leagues could instill important elements of competition without destroying the value of a championship playoff. Competition could prevail in the market for players and, more importantly, in the market for team locations. Individual leagues might be exempted from antitrust prosecution for intra-league coordination, but coordination other than to arrange uniform playing rules and a championship playoff among the leagues would be prohibited. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) provides an example of such an organization of leagues. Although the NCAA is intimately involved in the regulation of the player labor market, it does not constrain either the size of college sports leagues or team locations. The various leagues participate jointly in many national championship competitions. Divestiture would solve many of the problems plaguing professional sports. The competitive imbalance problem would be ameliorated as teams with large revenue bases found their home territories invaded by entrants from smaller revenue bases in the other leagues. Such invasions would persist until revenue potential per team was approximately equal on the margin. Cities that could financially support new franchises would find entry into one of the leagues easier and (much) cheaper as the leagues competed to add viable new locations. Attractive places for sports teams (like Los Angeles for football or Washington, D.C., for baseball) would find interest from currently struggling franchises and probably would not have to provide a free stadium or arena to procure a team. Television networks could play the competitive leagues off against each other in bidding for broadcasting rights, which would likely fall precipitously. The most serious risk in a sports industry comprised of competing leagues is the possibility that one league will eventually be viewed as "better" than the others, and the weaker leagues will fail or be absorbed by the stronger leagues. Minimally, the legislation would be needed to permit periodic divestiture if this should occur. An alternative approach is to prohibit existing leagues from exercising collective control over team relocations. This approach would reduce the disparity in revenue potential because some teams from markets with lower revenue potential would invade the geographic territories of teams currently monopolizing the largest revenue potential markets. The result, for instance, could easily be more baseball teams in New York City and Los Angeles. Competitive team imbalance would decline because the revenue potential would equalize across teams as the geographic territories of current "haves" were invaded by current "have nots." Subsidies from cities to teams would shrink because leagues would be unable to prevent teams from competing to enter a city offering attractive market potential. Player salaries also would decline because both local television revenues and government subsidies would decline. Some cities would lose teams initially, but this would apply political pressure on the leagues to expand the number of franchises, thereby helping to attenuate the ultimate source of their market power. Franchise mobility may increase in the short run but should stabilize once a balance between demand for and supply of teams is established. Introducing competition into the market for franchise locations could be accomplished by either congressional or judicial action. Even with competitive leagues, existing teams would have some leverage in negotiating for publicly subsidized playing facilities because fans develop emotional ties to particular teams. The collection of such ties constitutes a sunk investment in a particular team for a community and can rationalize subsidies to retain a particular franchise that would not be sensible if the identity of the service provider were of no concern to fans. A common solution to such contracting problems (similar to those which arise between a coal mine and a single purpose railroad spur to the mine) is common ownership-that is, vertical integration. In the context of professional sports, vertical integration would constitute common ownership of the team and the emotional investment in it-in short, team ownership by the municipal government. Unfortunately, at the top level, none of the four major team sports leagues in the United States permit municipal ownership.9 This restriction is also subject to challenge under the Sherman Antitrust Act, but unless or until it is overturned, it is another way in which monopoly power stands in the way of economic efficiency in professional sports. Implementing either divestiture or a competitive market for team relocations would be a substantial challenge. Either reform would make team owners and players worse off. Both groups are well organized and have powerful incentives to maintain any monopoly power that enhances team revenues. Taxpayers, in contrast, would end up better off as a result of either reform. We believe that potential gains to the winners exceed the likely burden on the losers because the reforms, which rely on competitive prices to shape the allocation of resources between the private and public sectors and within the public sector itself, should improve efficiency. However, because the winners are a diffuse group of numerous individuals with but modest individual incentives to press for reform, the prospects for change are grim.

------------------------------------------------Question

According to the article by Siegfried and Zimbalist, what do they recommend as the most effective policy for reducing team bargaining power with state and municipal governments? That is, what policy do they suggest so that local governments will no longer have to subsidize new stadiums? Explain.

viridianpig408

QUESTION 46

When the Fed buys a U.S. bond in the open market

		its action has no effect on the total reserves or the money supply because the check it writes increases reserves at one bank but they fall at another.
		its action expands total reserves and the money supply.
		its action contracts total reserves and the money supply.
		total reserves increase by the amount of the purchase but the money supply stays the same.

1.11 points

QUESTION 47

When the Fed sells government securities,

		reserves increase, leading to a decrease in the money supply by an amount more than the sale of the government securities.
		reserves decrease, leading to a decrease in the money supply by an amount more than the sale of the government securities.
		reserves increase, leading to a increase in the money supply by an amount more than the sale of the government securities.
		reserves decrease, leading to a increase in the money supply by an amount more than the sale of the government securities.

1.11 points

QUESTION 48

The maximum potential money multiplier is equal to

		the reserve ratio.
		one minus the reserve ratio
		the inverse of the required reserve ratio.
		the number of dollars on reserve.

1.11 points

QUESTION 49

The potential money multiplier gives us

		the growth in the money supply when income increases.
		the growth in real national income when the money supply increases.
		the maximum potential change in the money supply due to a change in income.
		the maximum potential change in the money supply due to a change in reserves.

1.11 points

QUESTION 50

An increase in the reserve ratio

		increases the money multiplier.
		will cause banks to make more loans.
		has an expansionary effect on the money supply.
		has a contractionary effect on the money supply.

1.11 points

QUESTION 51

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures

		banks against lawsuits.
		the deposits held in member banks.
		the deposits held in the Fed.
		the federal funds market.

1.11 points

QUESTION 52

Bank runs are a possibility because

		in difficult times people want currency instead of demand deposits.
		the FDIC is inefficient.
		banks do not keep enough reserves to cover all their depository liabilities.
		bankers are often poor businesspeople.

1.11 points

QUESTION 53

The manner in which FDIC deposit insurance is set up in the United States encourages banks to

		make riskier loans than they otherwise would.
		reject some loans that probably would be profitable.
		maintain excess reserves that are too great.
		be too conservative in their lending practices.

1.11 points

QUESTION 54

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

		discourages banks from engaging in excessive risk taking.
		was established after the Panic of 1907.
		only insures deposits in money-center banks.
		increases the stability of the banking system by reducing the likelihood of bank runs.

1.11 points

QUESTION 55

What are the two features of money that distinguish it from all other goods in the economy?

		Money is government issued and it is redeemable for gold or silver.
		Money is part of every barter transaction and it is divisible.
		Money is accepted as a medium of exchange and it is the common unit of account used to express prices.
		Money is a common unit of account and it is also can be traded for other currencies at a guaranteed exchange rate.

1.11 points

QUESTION 56

Holding money to meet unplanned expenditures and emergencies is known as

		asset demand.
		precautionary demand.
		aggregate demand.
		transactions demand.

1.11 points

QUESTION 57

When people want to hold money to make regular planned expenditures, this is

		the transaction demand for money.
		the spending demand for money.
		the asset demand for money.
		the precautionary demand for money.

1.11 points

QUESTION 58

When interest rates rise, the transactions demand for money usually

		decreases.
		increases.
		decreases initially and then increases to the original position.
		does not change.

1.11 points

QUESTION 59

As nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rises, the transactions demand for money

		increases, and the money demand curve shifts to the right.
		remains constant, and the money demand curve remains the same.
		decreases, and the money demand curve shifts to the left.
		increases, and the money demand curve shifts to the left.

1.11 points

QUESTION 60

One of the economic costs of holding currency is that

		it fulfills no precautionary role.
		it fulfills no transactions role.
		it earns no interest income.
		its real value always increases.

blacktrout920

a) You also wish to synthesize a degenerate oligonucleotide primer that could be used eventually to clone DNA that encodes your mutant protein. Design this degenerate oligo, keeping in mind the rules we talked about in class. More information about designing degenerate primers and primers in general are located on the following page.

Write out the sequence of this oligo here

b) If you synthesized the above oligonucleotide primer, how many different oligos would be present in the mixture?

RULES TO FOLLOW for creating primers (Modified from the Thermo Fisher web site):

Designing degenerate primers:

Write out your amino acid sequence, label amino and carboxy termini

For each amino acid, use the genetic code to predict the various nucleic acid codons that can encode this amino acid. For all but Met, you should have redundancy present.

Now you need think about 5â and 3â considerations, and keep in mind that DNA within genes is double-stranded. It is helpful to keep in mind that the 5â end of a gene corresponds to the amino terminus of a protein. Using 5â and 3â labels write out a single strand DNA sequence corresponding to the your amino seq of interest. You may choose to start with only possible codon for each amino acid, or you can do all possibilities using the notation I showed you in class to account for the wobble position of codons.

Now make your DNA double stranded by filling in the opposite DNA strand; label the 5â and 3â ends of this second strand and make sure you have an anti-parallel arrangement of DNA strands.

If you havenât already, now consider the redundancy present on both strands, and make sure you have indicated sequences that account for all possible redundancies.

Realize that when a researched synthesizes a degenerate oligo that the final synthesis contains oligos with every substitution possible. The amount of degeneracy is defined by the number of different primer combinations in the mix. You can determine the degree of degeneracy by multiplying the number of changes present at each position together. If a position has no degeneracy then you multiple by 1 for that position.

Keep in mind that the trade-off between primer specificity and efficiency can be modified by altering the degeneracy of the primer. For example, the more degenerate the primers, the less specific annealing will be; however, decreased degeneracy will allow more potential to identify unknown variants. Anything over 1024 fold degeneracy is at the upper limit of potential usefulness.

Designing Primers:

Good primer design is essential for a successful PCR reaction. There are many factors to take into account when designing the optimal primers for your gene of interest. This information is taken from the Fisher Scientific website and are used when actually designing an experiment. Here are some tips to consider when designing primers.

In general, a length of 18 nucleotides is the minimum necessary for efficient primer binding.

Try to make the melting temperature (Tmm) of the primers between 65Â°C and 75Â°C, and within 5Â°C of each other.

If the Tmm of your primer is very low, try to find a sequence with more GC content, or extend the length of the primer a little.

Aim for the GC content to be between 40 and 60%, with the 3' of a primer ending in C or G to promote binding. This is called a GC clamp.

Typically, 3 to 4 nucleotides are added 5â of the restriction enzyme site in the primer to allow for efficient cutting. Restriction enzymes are ENDO nucleases, so they cut better when their recognition site is not on the end of DNA.

Try to avoid regions of secondary structure, and have a balanced distribution of GC-rich and AT-rich domains.

Avoid intra-primer homology (more than 3 bases that complement within the primer) or inter-primer homology (forward and reverse primers having complementary sequences). These circumstances can lead to self-dimers or primer-dimers instead of annealing to the desired DNA sequences.

KNPE 153 Lecture Notes - Lecture 9: Net Force, Dynamic Equilibrium, Linear Stability

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