BIOL 103 Lecture Notes - Lecture 11: Mortality Rate, Thermoregulation, Gamete

• School: Queen's University
• Department: Biology
• Course: BIOL 103
• Professor: Virginia K Walker

Document Summary

Two partners in crime captured and jailed separately. Each players outcome is affected by the others move. Cooperate with the promise of a light sentence. Implicate your partner in hopes of getting off altogether: the best strategy depends upon whether the game is played once or over and over vs the same opponent, ha(cid:373)ilto(cid:374) a(cid:374)d a(cid:454)elrod arra(cid:374)ged a tour(cid:374)a(cid:373)e(cid:374)t for iterati(cid:448)e priso(cid:374)er(cid:859)s. For the iterative prisoners dilemma with the preceding pay off matrix the (cid:449)i(cid:374)(cid:374)er (cid:449)as the si(cid:373)plest progra(cid:373) (cid:272)alled (cid:858)tit-for-tat(cid:859: t4t starts by cooperating but then follows opponents last move. If the opponent defects then you defect (punish), if they cooperate then you continue cooperating (reward) Threat of punishment for being selfish: t4t strategy wins by rewarding cooperation and punishing defection. In iterative pd, t4t means that as soon as your accomplice cheats you retaliate and punish them. If they cooperate again, you play good will and cooperate in exchange.