POLS1005 Lecture Notes - Carl Von Clausewitz, Security Dilemma, Odysseus
21 May 2018
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[Lecture 3]
Today’s puzzle:
• War is costly, yet they still occur – so – why don’t states resolve their disputes non-violently?
War is puzzling:
• War is costly in both blood and treasure
• States would rather get what they want without going to war
• “In war, the aggressor is always peace-loving; he would prefer to take over our country
unopposed.” – Karl von Clausewitz
• Achilles & Odysseus (-1260BCE)
1. WHAT STATES FIGHT OVER:
What states fight over: Territory
• More than half of all wars since 1700 have been over territory.
- To enrich state: natural resources – oil, minerals, farmland
- Strategically important
- Historically or ethnically significant
- E.g. Israel
What states also fight over:
• National policy – e.g. chemical weapons in Syria
• Regime type or change – e.g. Vietcong in Vietnam, Taliban in Afghanistan
• Ethnic or religious divisions – e.g. Shi’ites v. Sunnis, Arabs v. Israelis
2. FAILED BARGAINS
Failed bargains
• Bargaining - efforts of two or more actors who try to resolve disputes over allocation of a
good
• Crisis bargaining – an interaction in which at least one party has threatened the use of force
if demands are unmet
• Coercive diplomacy – one state seeks to influence the bargaining outcome by threatening to
use force – but there is no time restraint unlike crisis bargaining when doing this bargain
• Threats – (verbal or troop movements) can be used to gain concessions includes ultimatums
• Crucial assumptions:
1. War is costly
2. A settlement that both sides would prefer to war generally exists
Failed bargains can also result from to…
• Anarchy – a permissive condition for war. Realism sees two resulting dynamics that lead to
wars:
- A preventive motive – nip a rising power in the bud
- A security dilemma (spiral) – fear of attack. States are responsible for their own
security, result in a security dilemma, but this explanation is incomplete; it cannot tell
us about particular wars.
• Misperception - leaders misperceive their situation. They may…
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
- Overestimate own capabilities
- Underestimate the capabilities of resolve of adversaries
- Incorrectly fear an imminent attack and strike out
• Domestic policies – some powerful group stands to benefit from war
3. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Wars from incomplete information
• Incomplete information leads to two bargaining mistakes:
- Yielding too little
- Demanding too much
• Basically a risk-return-trade-off as a result of crisis bargaining under certainty
• A trade-off between trying to get a good deal and reducing the risk of war
• These types of wars tend to be short [Weisiger 2013]
• During the war previously private information becomes public
• Under reduced uncertainty it is easier to strike a bargain
• Wars stemming from commitment problems tend to last longer
• The longest wars have been fought between declining and rising states when preventive
motivations are the largest
States have incentives to misrepresent
• They may want to seem weaker or stronger than they are
• May want to keep adversary guessing
• This can lead to bluffing
• Keep military secrets secret
• Another common area with incentives to misrepresent – how much of a country’s resources it
will be willing to mobilise to fight (aka resolve)
How to communicate resolve?
• Brinkmanship – a form of the chicken game
• Tying hands – public pronouncements that raise audience costs
• Paying for power – committing resources (mobilizing troops)
4. COMMITMENT PROBLEMS
• Even if you reach a settlement in your bargaining range, can you trust your adversary to
honour the deal?
• Remember the Prisoner’s Dilemma
• Just as in an anarchic world, the prisoners lack an enforcement mechanism to seal the best
deal
• In an anarchic world, in which trust may be in short supply and information is incomplete,
how can you keep your counterpart from defecting from the deal?
• How can you avoid the “sucker’s payoff”?
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
War is puzzling: war is costly in both blood and treasure, states would rather get what they want without going to war. In war, the aggressor is always peace-loving; he would prefer to take over our country unopposed. karl von clausewitz: achilles & odysseus (-1260bce, what states fight over: What states fight over: territory: more than half of all wars since 1700 have been over territory. To enrich state: natural resources oil, minerals, farmland. Failed bargains can also result from to : anarchy a permissive condition for war. Realism sees two resulting dynamics that lead to wars: A preventive motive nip a rising power in the bud. A security dilemma (spiral) fear of attack. States are responsible for their own security, result in a security dilemma, but this explanation is incomplete; it cannot tell us about particular wars: misperception - leaders misperceive their situation. Underestimate the capabilities of resolve of adversaries.
